Statutory Liens in Bankruptcy by Kennedy, Frank R.




Statutory Liens in Bankruptcy
Frank R. Kennedy
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kennedy, Frank R., "Statutory Liens in Bankruptcy" (1955). Minnesota Law Review. 1313.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1313
697
STATUTORY LIENS IN BANKRUPTCY
FRANK R. KENNEDY*
In general equality is equity. The principal raison d'etre for
bankruptcy is that it terminates the race for preference among
creditors by substituting an orderly, equitable distribution of a
debtor's assets among all his deserving creditors.: Yet the principle
of equality-or of ratable distribution, which is the the intended
connotation of equality in this context-is not carried nearly so far
as the uninitiated may suppose.
THE PLIGHT OF THE GENERAL CREDITOR IN BANKRUPTCY
English judges early acknowledged the conflict between the
policy of bankruptcy legislation to insure equal distribution and that
of the common law to accord liens to certain classes of persons in
possession of chattels until their demands were satisfied.2 Generally
the bankruptcy policy has yielded. a Nor have mortgages or other
kinds of consensual liens been leveled for the sake of achieving
equality of distribution unless shown to be (1) fraudulent as to
creditors,3 (2) preferential because obtained during insolvency and
shortly before bankruptcy to secure antecedent indebtedness, 4 or (3)
*Professor of Law, State University of Iowa. Member, National Bank-
ruptcy Conference. Member of the bars of Missouri and the Supreme Court of
of the United States. The author was assisted in the preparation of this article
by Michael J. Jones, third-year student, State University of Iowa College of
Law.
1. "... [T]he theme of the Bankruptcy Act is equality of distribution."
Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U. S. 215, 219 (1941). The
primacy of the purpose to achieve equitable distribution has been character-
istic of all bankruptcy law, including the Roman prototype. See Levinthal,
The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 223, 225, 235(1918). See also 3 Collier, Bankruptcy ff 60.01 (14th ed. rev. 1950) ; 4 id.
1 67.01 (14th ed. rev. 1954). The treatise referred to in this note will herein-
after be cited as Collier.
2. See, e.g., Ex parte Deeze, 1 Atkyns 228, 229, 26 Eng. Rep. 146, 147(Ch. 1748) (packer's lien) ; Kruger v. Wilcox, Ambler 252, 253, 27 Eng. Rep.
168 (Ch. 1755) (factor's lien). Other instances are cited in Montagu, A Sum-
mary of the Law of Lien 1-2 (1st Am. ed. 1824).
2a. In addition to the cases cited in the preceding note, see, e.g., Ex parte
Bush, 7 Viner's Abr. 74, 2 Eq. Cases Abr. 109, 22 Eng. Rep. 93 (Ch. 1734)(attorney's lien); Austin v. O'Reilly, 2 Fed. Cas. 234, No. 665 (C.C. S.D.
Miss. 1875) (landlord's lien); Hartman v. Swiger, 215 Fed. 986 (N.D.
W.Va. 1914) (attorney's lien); cf. The Louie Dole, 14 Fed. 862 (C.C. N.D.
Ill. 1883) (maritime lien for services rendered vessel).
3. Fraudulent liens are voidable by the trustee under §§ 67d, 70c, and 70e
of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. §§ 107d, 110c, and 110e (1952). Further
reference to the Bankruptcy Act will dispense with citations to 11 U. S. C.,
since the section numbering followed in the Statutes at Large is more familiar.
4. Voidable preferences are defined in § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. The
section reaches back four months before bankruptcy in striking down prefer-
ential transfers, including those creating or fixing a lien other than a statutory
lien. The feature of permitting certain liens to be avoided if made within
a short time before bankruptcy (usually four months under modern American
bankruptcy legislation) has been traced to a principle adopted in early Italian
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voidable by creditors under nonbankruptcy law.4a After mischief-
making careers as fronts for secret security,5 unperfected legal liens
and equitable liens capable of becoming perfected legal liens were
finally brought under control by legislation assimilating those not
perfected over four months before bankruptcy to preferential liens.a
Equitable liens perfected in time or enforceable against buyers in
the ordinary course of trade are preserved against the trustee.7
Liens acquired through judicial proceedings are likewise enforce-
able notwithstanding bankruptcy under modem legislation unless
acquired during insolvency and shortly before bankruptcy of the
debtor.8 Until 1938 statutory liens were generally regarded in
American bankruptcy with a respect approximating that accorded
common-law liens.9
But bankruptcy has not only permitted secured creditors to re-
tain their preferred positions. It has indeed so far diverged from
the ideal of pro rata distribution as to set up a schedule of priorities
among unsecured claimants.10 Finally the courts themselves have
recognized a judicial power to subordinate certain claims because
of equitable considerations militating against pro rata distribution.1-
A persistent problem in modem bankruptcy administration is its
typically small dividend yield for general creditors, i.e., those with-
out security or priority of any kind.1 2 A preponderant majority of
law. Levinthal, supra note 1, at 2,12. Secret liens may fall within the con-
demnation of the preference section without reference to the date of their
creation. See 3 Collier 60.01 et seq.
4a. Sections 70c and 70e enable the trustee to take advantage of non-
bankruptcy law for this purpose.
5. See McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 Harv. L.
Rev. 341, 385-390 (1927).
6. This reform, somewhat oversimplified in statement for the purpose
of the present discussion, is the result of the 1938 and 1950 amendments of
§ 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. For full discussion see 3 Collier f111 60.06, 60.37,
60.50.
7. 3 Collier 60.50; 4 Collier ff 70.62, 70.87.
8. The period of vulnerability here also is the four months before bank-
ruptcy. See Bankruptcy Act § 67a, discussed in 4 Collier 1 67.03.
9. 4 Collier 1111 67.02 [3], 67.20 [1].
10. Section 64a provides for five classes of priority claimants among
unsecured creditors.
11. See Moore and Countryman, Debtors' and Creditors' Rights: Cases
and Materials 1003-1042 (1951) ; Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66
Harv. L. Rev. 1013 (1953).
12. See McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 Harv. L.
Rev. 341, 390 (1927) ; Sen. Doc. No. 65, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-10 (1932). The
smallness of the dividends contributed substantially to the downfall of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1867. Id. at 54. Professor MacLachlan, whose name under-
went a legal change in its spelling in 1948, has properly pointed out, however,
that invidious comparisons of dividend percentages in bankruptcy with those
in nonbankruptcy liquidations tend to ignore the selective process which
relegates the most hopeless cases to bankruptcy. McLaughlin, Aspects of the
Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 369, 381(1937).
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all bankruptcies are "no-asset" cases.' 3 When less than twenty per
cent of the proceeds that are realized from bankrupt estates regu-
larly goes to the large but lowly class of general creditors, 1 it is
not surprising that most creditors take no active part or interest in
the administration of estates against which they have claims. The
safeguards to insure efficient administration and prevent abuses
supposed to be built into the Bankruptcy Act by the provisions for
democratic creditor control do not work when apathy overcomes
the constituency. This is such a serious problem that it has given
rise to proposals for drastic overhauling of bankruptcy machinery. 5
Although some of these proposals are no doubt ill-advised, let there
be no misappreciation of the seriousness of the plight of the un-
secured creditor in bankruptcy.
The most direct approach to the problem of improving the status
of unsecured creditors in bankruptcy is to increase their share by
reducing the portions that go to secured creditors and claimants
to priority. Broadly speaking, American bankruptcy legislation ap-
13. Less than a fifth of the cases concluded during each of the last
two reported years were "asset cases." Rep. Director of Admin. Office of U. S.
Courts 200 (1953); Rep. Director of Admin. Office of U. S. Courts 180
(1952).
14. See Table F5 in Rep. Director of Admin. Office of U. S. Courts
204-207 (1953); Rep. Director of Admin. Office of U. S. Courts 184-187
(1952). The tables in these two reports, the latest available at this writing,
assign approximately a third of the proceeds to secured creditors, a fourth
to administrative expenses, and a sixth to priority claimants. Exempt,
abandoned, and wholly encumbered property which has not been administered
in bankruptcy apparently is not reflected in these figures in any way.
15. Perhaps the most drastic proposals were contained in a series of
four bills, numbered S. 2560-S. 2563, introduced August 1, 1953, by Senator
Langer, then Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Briefly, the pro-
posed amendments would provide for: (1) appointment of official salaried
attorneys to represent receivers and trustees in bankruptcy; (2) selection of
salaried receivers and trustees; (3) investor representation by United States
attorneys in bankruptcy proceedings; (4) investor protection on complaint
by any investor by United States attorneys and the judge. Two critical dis-
cussions, Gleick, The Langer Bills: A Discussion, 40 A. B. A. J. 382 (1954),
and Horsky and McGiffert, The Langer Bills: A Challenge to Creditor Con-
trol, 27 Temp. L. Q. 261 (1953), reveal the objections to the proposed
changes. Whatever the deficiencies of the system of creditor control with its
reliance on creditor self-interest as affording the best hope for securing
efficient bankruptcy administration, these critics with impressive practical
wisdom challenge the premise that a paternalistic bureaucracy would achieve
better results. See also McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend
the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 369, 374 (1937). The Langer bills
were disapproved by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Report
of Procdgs of Regular Ann. Mtg. of Jud. Conf. of U. S. 14 (1954).
A more modest proposal for official examiners, professional trustees, and
supervisory administrators was advanced in the Thacher-Garrison report of
1932, Sen. Doc. No. 65, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 93-96, 104-111 (1932). For a
proposal to free bankruptcy estates of the burden of the fees required to
support referees' salary and expense funds see Wagner, The Commercial
Lawyer in the Bankruptcy Court, 57 Coin. L. J. 309, 310 (1952).
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pears to have moved in this direction.' Three notable steps were
taken in the Chandler Act of 1938: (1) Consensual securities there-
tofore impregnable in bankruptcy were brought within the con-
demnation of the preference provision ;17 (2) the schedule of priori-
ties was substantially trimmed by the elimination of all state-created
priorities but one, viz., a limited priority for landlords ;18 (3) statu-
tory liens on personalty unaccompanied by possession and liens of
distress for rent were postponed to the priorities accorded admin-
istrative-expense and wage claims,' 9 and wage and rent liens were
restricted except as against other liens.2 0 It was later determined
16. The Bankruptcy Acts of 1800 and 1841, the first two federal bank-
ruptcy statutes, explicitly saved all existing liens from impairment. 2 Stat.
36 (1800) ; 5 Stat. 442 (1841). Nevertheless fraudulent liens were surely in-
valid under both Acts. 2 Stat 26 (1800) ; 5 Stat 442 (1841). And to a limited
extent preferential securities were subject to invalidation under the 1841 legis-
lation. 5 Stat 442, discussed in 3 Collier ff 60.05. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867
for the first time authorized invalidation of attachment liens acquired within
four months of bankruptcy. 14 Stat 522. All varieties of liens acquired throughjudicial proceedings became vulnerable to attack under the Act of 1898. See 4
Collier ff 67.02[2]. The Act of 1867 and the Act of 1898 extended, each in its
turn, the powers of the statutory liquidator to avoid preferential and fraudu-
lent liens. 3 Collier ff 60.05; 4 Collier f111 67.01, 67.02[4), 70.02. "The history
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, in broad outline, has been one of repeated
amendments ever strengthening the law of preference to protect the general
creditor." McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 Harv. L.
Rev. 233, 235-236 (1946). In 1910 the trustee acquired the strong arm of a
levying creditor as of the date of bankruptcy to use against tenuous liens on
property in the debtor's possession. 36 Stat 840, discussed in 4 Collier f1 70.47.
His powers have been strengthened by recent amendments of § 70c. Katcher,
Powers of Trustee Under Amended Section 70c-Weakened or Strengthened?,
58 Com. L. J. 60 (1953). But see Moore and Tone, Proposed Bankruptcy
Amendments: Improvement or Retrogression?, 57 Yale L. J. 683, 692 n. 33(1948).
For a summary description of the process of degradation to which tax
priorities have been subjected see Wurzel, Taxation During Bankruptcy
Liquidation, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1141, 1145-1146 (1942).
17. Section 60, the preference provision of the Bankruptcy Act, was ex-
tensively revised in 1938. Notable was the adoption of the "bona fide pur-
chaser" test: A transfer was deemed to have been made for the purpose of
applying the section when it had become so far perfected that no bona fide
purchaser from the debtor and no creditor could thereafter acquire any rights
in the property superior to those of the transferee. Certain security devices,
such as trust receipts in some states, could never meet the test. 3 Collierff 60.38.
18. The purpose of this reform to maximize the residual fund for dis-
tribution among the general creditors was recognized in the Analysis of H. R.
12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 201 (1936). See also Weinstein, Amendments to
the Bankruptcy Act as Proposed and Pending Before the Congress, 24 J. N. A.
Ref. Bankr. 28, 32 (1950). Under § 64a(5), state-created rent priorities are
on the fifth (lowest) rung of the ladder of priority claimants. Rent priorities
are -limited to "rent which is legally due and owing for actual use and
occupancy of the premises affected, and which accrued within three months
before the date of bankruptcy."
19. Debts for certain administrative expenses and wages are the first
two classes of claims entitled to priority of payment under § 64a(1) and (2).
20. The amount of payment of wage and rent liens was restricted to the
same extent as are wage and rent priorities under § 64a(2) and (5) of the
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that, at least in the light of its judicial construction, the preference
provision was too sweeping, and Congress restricted its apparent
reach somewhat.2 1 But the elimination of state-created priorities has
stood, and the trustee has been given additional powers with respect
to statutory liens: by the amendment of 195222 the trustee may
invalidate state statutory liens on personalty unaccompanied by
possession, levy, distraint, or sequestration or, when advisable, he
may preserve such liens for the benefit of the estate. Moreover, the
wage-and-rent-lien restrictions stand in every case but if such re-
striction would redound to the benefit of other lienors, the trustee
is empowered to preserve the wage or rent lien to the extent of the
excess for the benefit of the estate.
In view of the obvious considerations supporting legislation
leveling securities and priorities for the purposes of bankruptcy
liquidation, it may be wondered why the evolutionary process re-
ferred to has not proceeded further and faster. The explanation of
course is that there are weighty interests against which the ad-
vantages of achieving equality in bankruptcy distribution must be
balanced. In the drafting of early legislation it was not conceived
that bankruptcy could properly affect completed transactions creat-
ing liens against the bankrupt's property except for fraud.2 3 It has
taken many years of historical development of nonbankruptcy law
to bring the "title" of the mortgagee and the conditional vendor
to the status of a lien,24 and indeed the development has not yet been
fully consummated.2 5 While a lien is a less refractory interest for
Act. Wages under § 64a(2) cannot exceed $600 for each claimant and must
be earned within three months before bankruptcy. As to rent priority re-
strictions see note 18 supra.
21. Congress elaborately amended § 60 in 1950. 64 Stat. 25. The "bona
fide purchaser" test, referred to in note 17 mipra, was changed to a "lien
creditor test" so far as transfers of property other than real property are
concerned: generally a transfer is made for the purpose of the section when
perfected to the extent that "no subsequent lien . . . obtainable by legal
or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become superior to the
rights of the transferee." The bona fide purchaser test was retained for
real property transfers, and a special test was fashioned for equitable liens.
See 3 Collier ff 60.38 et seq.
22. 66 Stat. 427.
23. See note 16 supra.
24. Lloyd, Mortgages-The Genesis of the Lien Theory, 32 Yale L. J.
233 (1923) ; Note, 20 Iowa L. Rev. 616 (1935) ; Note, 17 Minn. L. Rev. 66
(1932); 1 Jones, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales § 1 (6th ed.,
Bowers, 1933). There is no disposition here to exaggerate the importance of
differentiating the "lien theory" from the "title theory" of security trans-
actions. Cf. Sturges and Clark, Legal Theory and Real Property Mortgages,
37 Yale L. J. 691 (1928) ; Gilmore and Axelrod, Chattel Security: I, 57 Yale
L. J. 517, 530 (1948).
25. See, e.g., In re Lake's Laundry, Inc., 79 F. 2d 326 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied sub norn. Lake's Laundry, Inc. v. Braun, 296 U. S. 622 (1935),
criticized in 49 Harv. L. Rev. 328 (1935) (conditional vendor held to be
1955]
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legislatures and courts than title,28 the economic, social, and political
justifications for secured credit cannot be ignored in the making of
bankruptcy policy, and the considerations underlying the priorities
that have been recognized in bankruptcy have such a manifest
appeal27 that efforts to breal: them down will always encounter
strong legislative reluctance. Bankruptcy must serve the legitimate
ends of commercial intercourse and of society generally. If the
bankruptcy policy makers go too far in their zeal for improving the
lot of the unsecured creditors, those adversely affected by the
change are likely to find ways of overcoming it or at least protecting
themselves. 28 The result may be less desirable than the status quo
ante.
A statute creating a lien reflects a legislative judgment that the
class of persons made lienors thereby needs to be protected against
the hazards to which unsecured creditors are subject. One of the
hazards, of course, is insolvency. Invalidation of a statutory lien in
bankruptcy goes far to frustrate the legislative purpose in enacting
the lien statute in the first place.
There can be no serious question as to the power of Congress
to enact bankruptcy legislation overriding state statutory liens, sub-
ject, perhaps, to the vague limitations imposed by the due process
clause. 29 The nullification of state-created liens has an obvious rela-
tion to the primary bankruptcy objective of equitable distribution.
But what is the rational justification for the complex and confusing
provisions of Section 67c subjecting certain statutory liens in par-
ticular circumstances, and a single nonstatutory variety in every
circumstance, 30 to differing degrees of impairment?
owner rather than lienor under § 77B) ; In re Pointer Brewing Co., 105 F. 2d
478 (8th Cir. 1939), criticized in 24 Minn. L. Rev. 101 (1939) (unrecorded
conditional sale erroneously upheld as against trustee in bankruptcy) ; Griffin
and Curtis, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales 2-3 (5th ed. 1931)
(chattel mortgage "more than a mere lien"). But see id. at 282 (interest of
conditional vendor said to be reduced by statutes "to a lien similar to that
created by a chattel mortgage").
26. Cf. McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 369, 390 (1937), discussing a proposal to
make a preferential lien more easily voidable than a preferential transfer in-
tended to be absolute.
27. See 3 Collier 111 64.02, 64.201, 64.301 ; Wurzel, supra note 16.
28. Cf. Moore and Tone, supra note 16, at 686-699; MacLachlan, Prefer-
ence Redefined, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1390 (1950).
29. The court in Ginsberg v. Lindel, 107 F. 2d 721 (8th Cir. 1939),
indicating that retrospective application of the three-month limitation im-
posed by §§ 67c and 64a of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938 on a "vested" statutory
landlord's lien would be unconstitutional, declined to accede to such an appli-
cation in order to avoid the constitutional difficulty. But see the excellent
analysis of the constitutional issues in Martin, Substantive Regulation of
Security Devices Under the Bankruptcy Power, 48 Col. L. Rev. 62 (1948).
30. Cf. In re Jay & Dee Store Co., 37 F. Supp. 989, 991 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
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SECTION 67c OF THE CHANDLER ACT OF 1938
Let us first examine the language of subdivisions b and c of
Section 67 as enacted by the Chandler Act of 1938:31
"b. The provisions of section 60 of this Act to the contrary
notwithstanding, statutory liens in favor of employees, contrac-
tors, mechanics, landlords, or other classes of persons, and statu-
tory liens for taxes and debts owing to the United States or any
State or subdivision thereof, created or recognized by the laws
of the United States or of any State, may be valid against the
trustee, even though arising or perfected while the debtor is in-
solvent and within four months prior to the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy or of the original petition under chapter X, XI, XII,
or XIII of this Act, by or against him. Where by such laws such
liens are required to be perfected and arise but are not perfected
before bankruptcy, they may nevertheless be valid, if perfected
within the time permitted by and in accordance with the require-
ments of such laws, except that if such laws require the liens to
be perfected by the seizure of property, they shall instead be per-
fected by filing notice thereof with the court.
"c. Where not enforced by sale before the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy or of an original petition under chapter X, XI, XII,
or XIII of this Act, though valid under subdivision b of this sec-
tion, statutory liens, including liens for taxes or debts owing to
the United States or to any State or subdivision thereof, on per-
sonal property not accompanied by possession of such property,
and liens, whether statutory or not, of distress for rent shall be
postponed in payment to the debts specified in clauses (1) and
(2) of subdivision a of section 64 of this Act, and, except as
against other liens, such liens for wages or for rent shall be re-
stricted in the amount of their payment to the same extent as
provided for wages and rent respectively in subdivision a of
section 64 of this Act."
The legislative record accompanying these provisions, like the
subdivisions themselves, emphasizes two contradictory objectives.
On the one hand the draftsmen wanted to put beyond question the
validity of statutory liens in bankruptcy even when otherwise
preferential under Section 60 and even when perfected after bank-
ruptcy.a2 On the other hand the draftsmen were concerned about
liens for taxes and for rent, presumably inter alia, which often were
allowed to accumulate over a number of years and to become so
large as to consume most or all of a bankrupt's estate, even to the
exclusion of administrative expense and wage claimants.3" These
inharmonious objectives were sought to be reconciled in the two
convoluted subdivisions of Section 67 that deal with statutory liens.
31. 52 Stat. 876 (1938).
32. Committee Report Analysis of H. R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 211
(1936) ; Weinstein, The Bankruptcy Law of 1938, 144 (1938).
33. Committee Report Analysis, .mpra note 32, at 212; Weinstein, op.
cit. supra note 32, at 144. Cf. notes 101-102 infra and text thereto.
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Section 67c had to be read, of course, as qualifying Section 67b's
sweeping validation of statutory liens3 4 notwithstanding the absence
in the latter subdivision of any intimation that its language was
subject to exception or limitation. The tentativeness of the attack
on statutory liens in subdivision c is suggested by the fact that no
statutory lien was invalidated, that certain liens only were postponed
or restricted, 35 and that the following kinds of statutory liens were
not affected at all:
(1) statutory liens on real property;
(2) statutory liens on personalty (except those of distress for
rent) 3 6 accompanied by possession of the property by the
lienor;
(3) statutory liens enforced by sale prior to bankruptcy.
Wage and rent liens on personalty unaccompanied by possession
were restricted to the same extent as are wage and rent priorities,37
34. Insofar as § 67b validated statutory liens, including those perfected
after bankruptcy, it pretty much codified pre-existing law. 4 Collier 1
67.02[3], 67.26. But cf. Note, 3 Stan. L. Rev. 711, 717 (1951), making the
point that pre-existing law did not distinguish statutory liens from other
kinds of liens. While § 67b expressly immunizes statutory liens from avoid-
ance as preferences under § 60, there is no reason for saving statutory liens
from application of § 70c. Those not effective at bankruptcy as against levy-
ing creditors under applicable nonbankruptcy law are therefore invalid as
against the trustee. 4 Collier I 67.26.
35. Statutory liens on personal property not accompanied by possession
and liens, whether statutory or not, of distress for rent were postponed and
liens for wages or rent were restricted.
36. All liens of distress for rent, whether statutory or common-law,
were postponed and restricted regardless of possession. 4 Collier 111 67.23,
67.27[2], 67.28. The reason for striking out at the lien of distress with such
vigor is suggested by the following quotation from the House Committee
Report explaining the restriction of the landlord's priority in § 64a(5):
"The statistics gathered by the Attorney General indicate that rent claims
consume a very substantial portion of an estate, and in smaller estates not
infrequently use up all of the funds." H. R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. 16 (1937). Distress for rent, a mode of self-help recognized at common
law but rejected in some states and modified by statute in others, is a remedy
peculiarly susceptible of frustrating the objective of equitable distribution in
bankruptcy. See 4 Collier 1 67.23. Although the Bankruptcy Act speaks of
liens of distress, it has been doubted that distress gives rise to more than a
priority. See Goodman, Rent as a Priority Claim in Bankruptcy it Virginia,
3 Va. L. Rev. 366 (1916) (discussing both common-law and statutory dis-
traint). Cf. United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U. S. 353
(1945) (statutory lien of distress held inchoate and general and therefore
inferior to federal priority under Rev. Stat. § 3466 (1875), 31 U. S. C. § 191(1952)). Modern English law regards a landlord as neither a secured nor a
preferential creditor but as one having "a preferential right of distress if there
are goods of the debtor upon which he can levy." Roper, Practical Guide for
Trustees in Bankruptcy 296 (1929).
Nonstatutory liens of distress for rent under § 67c are not likely to
include contractual liens. Ginsberg v. Lindel, 107 F. 2d 721 (8th Cir. 1939).
37. The priority for wages under § 64a(2) cannot exceed $600 for each
claimant nor attach to earnings for any period over three months before
bankruptcy. Rent claims entitled to priority under § 64a(5) are restricted
to those which accrue within three months before the date of bankruptcy.
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but the restriction was taken off when it would redound to the
benefit of other lienors rather than unsecured creditors .3
The experiment drew less fire from those whose interests were
aligned with the statutory lienors affected39 than from those pri-
marily interested in improving bankruptcy law and administration,
including the National Bankruptcy Conference whence emanated the
subordination and restriction provisions of the Chandler Act.40 As-
suming the soundness of some measure relieving bankrupt estates
against the burden of statutory liens, the effectiveness of Section 67c
of the Chandler Act was impaired by the imposition of arbitrary
limitations. Assuming the soundness of preserving some preferential
rights for statutory lienors in bankruptcy, Section 67c of the Chan-
dler Act drew arbitary distinctions in classifying the interests to be
protected.
Immunity for Liens on Realty
The saving intact of statutory liens on realty by subdivision c
has been explained as a concession to "historical development, and
the inherent differences in the incidents attaching to real and per-
sonal property. '41 The weight attached to historical considerations
in connection with statutory liens on realty seems almost wholly
gratuitous. It is doubted that statutory liens on realty are any more
steeped in history than statutory liens on personalty. Indeed, in view
of the fact that the common law does not recognize any lien on realty
other than such as are created consensually or by the the court as an
instrument for affording equitable relief,42 it can be argued with
force that statutory liens on personalty have a stronger historical
38. This by the phrase, "except as against other liens." Weinstein,
op. cit. supra note 32, at 145.
39. H. R. 5796, introduced in the 83d Congress, is believed to be the only
proposal to amend § 67c not presented at the instance of the National Bank-
ruptcy Conference. This bill, which passed the House on July 19, 1954, would
have made clear that state and local tax liens and federal tax liens are on a
parity for the purposes of § 67c as amended in 1952. See notes 92 and 99 infra.
The bill was pushed by spokesmen for state and local taxing authorities.
Hearing Before Subcommittee No. 2 of thd House Committee on the Judiciary
on H. R. 5796, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
40. The role of the National Bankruptcy Conference in preparing the
Chandler Act is described briefly in McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler
Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 369, 375-379, 395(1937). The Conference participated actively in drafting amendatory legisla-
tion in 1952, see H. R. Rep. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 13-14 (1952),
but has been studying further possible revision ever since. Hanna and Mac-
Lachlan, The Bankruptcy Act with Annwtations 98 (5th ed. 1953).
41. Committee Report Analysis, supra note 32, at 212. See also Hanna
and MacLachlan, op. cit. supra note 40, at 98; Weinstein, op. cit. supra
note 32, at 145.
42. 7 Holdsworth, History of English Law 511-513 (1926); 1 Jones
Liens 2 (3d ed. 1914). Lands, being subject to seigniorial and family claims,
were not an asset available to creditors at common law. 2 Pollock and Mait-
land, History of English Law 596 (2d ed. 1899). Accordingly no lien on realty
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sanction. Certainly that appears to be true with respect to statutory
liens that are counterparts o: refinements of common-law liens.
The federal tax lien,44 one of the most conspicuous of statutory
liens, has always been made to attach without discrimination be-
tween real and personal property.45 Historical considerations have
not been thought relevant in respect to the avoidance of liens on
realty when acquired through judicial proceedings40 or when
preferential' 7 or fraudulent"8 or when voidable for any reason under
state law.4 9 Indeed, the "six months rule" applied in equity re-
could arise from a judgment or from judicial proceedings seeking enforce-
ment of a judgment. 2 Freeman, Judgments 1927 (5th ed. 1925) ; 1 Freeman,
Executions 572 (2d ed. 1888).
43. Many statutory liens are improved versions of common-law liens
recognized at common law. 1 Jones, Liens 93 (3d ed. 1914). The law may not
be clear as to whether a statute regulating a particular kind of lien is exclu-
sive. In such a jurisdiction the question may arise whether there is a right of
election to pursue the common-law or the statutory remedy. If the creditor
may choose his type of lien, there may nevertheless be a question as to what
choice he has made between well nigh indistinguishable liens. See, e.g.,
Henderson v. Mayer, 225 U. S. 631, 638 (1912) (statutory landlord's lien
regarded as "full equivalent of a common law distress") ; Goggin v. Bank of
America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 183 F. 2d 322 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U. S. 877 (1950) (statutory banker's lien regarded as having same scope as
common-law lien). If the lien is statutory, it is by virtue of § 67b entitled to
be perfected after bankruptcy and excepted from application of § 60, but it
may be subject to postponement, restriction, invalidation, or preservation for
the benefit of the estate under § 67c. 4 Collier 111 67.20[2]-[5], 67.23; Note,
3 Stan. L. Rev. 711, 722, 725-726 (1951).
44. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321: "If any person liable to pay any tax
neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount (including
any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together
with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of
the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real
or personal, belonging to such person."
45. Derivation of the general tax lien statute is commonly traced to
14 Stat. 107 (1866). See Hist. note, 26 U. S. C. A. § 3670 (1940). Substan-
tially the same statute, however, appeared earlier in 13 Stat. 470-471 (1865).
46. Judgment liens, which attach almost exclusively to realty, as well as
other types of liens acquired through judicial proceedings are avoidable by the
trustee within the limitations prescribed by § 67a. The nature of the property
subject to the lien is a matter of indifference in the application of the sub-
division.
47. Section 60, the preference section, does distinguish between transfers
of personalty in this respect: A rreferential transfer of realty is not deemed
to have been made for the purposes of the section until it has become perfected
as against subsequent bona fide purchasers; a transfer of personalty on the
other hand is deemed to have been made when perfected as against an
ordinary levying creditor. § 60a(2). There is thus at least a formal discrimi-
nation against preferential liens on realty in that a greater degree of per-
fection is required with respect to such liens to start the four-month period
of limitations running. See 3 Collier 1 60.41.
48. No distinction is made with respect to the nature of the property
involved in either § 67d or § 70e, the provisions authorizing avoidance of
fraudulent transfers.
49. Subdivisions c and e of § 70, which enable the trustee to invoke
creditors' remedies afforded by state law in avoiding transfers of property
of the bankrupt, treat liens against real property with neither more nor less
respect than that accorded them by state law.
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ceiverships of railroads, whereby certain expenses were accorded
priority even over real estate mortgages, affords a precedent for
subordinating liens on realty to unsecured claims.4 9a
There are of course practical differences between realty and
personalty which may justify differing legislative approaches in
dealing with liens on the two kinds of property.50 Real property is
less subject to being moved, destroyed, or otherwise converted than
personal property.0a The volume of secured credit that is extended
every day, however, on so mobile and destructible an item of per-
sonalty as the automobile raises doubts as to the wisdom or realism
of a statute that treats liens on realty as sacrosanct and liens on
personalty as vulnerable because of the differences in the nature of
the property.,' Indeed, notwithstanding the fixity of realty and the
greater ease of its identification, it is at least arguable that the
problem of providing a satisfactory method for perfecting liens
has been more successfully solved with respect to automobiles than
as to land.5 2 Frequently of course the differences between realty
and personalty tend to disappear: every first-year law student is
familiar with the shadowy area lying between real property and
personal property which is so productive of litigation. 3 The reasons
49a. Hanna and MacLachlan, op. cit. supra. note 40, at 98.
50. Differing provisions are made in the Act with respect to the validity
of post-bankruptcy transfers of the bankrupt's real and personal property. The
pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding must be made a matter of record
in every county where real property of the bankrupt is situated in order to
put subsequent purchasers, including lienors, on constructive notice. § 21g.
Adjudication or the taking of possession by a bankruptcy receiver cuts off
the possibility of the acquisition of any indefeasible interest in the bankrupt's
personalty other than currency and negotiable instruments. § 70d. Section 21g
is a concession to the policy of protecting persons who rely on local records
in acquiring interests in real estate. The limitations placed on the protection
accorded persons acquiring interests in personalty perhaps constitute another
reflection of the view of the draftsmen of the 1938 Act that such interests
are somehow more tenuous than interests in realty and therefore more easily
disregarded in the interest of maximizing the estate available for distribution.
Section 21g, however, does prescribe a procedure whereby the realty of the
bankrupt may be put beyond the power of any interest to attach after bank-
ruptcy, whereas it may be somewhat more difficult to put even the non-
negotiable personalty of the bankrupt immediately beyond the reach of a sub-
sequent transferee by virtue of the delay that may intervene before adjudica-
tion or the satisfaction of the statutory condition requisite to the appointment
of a receiver. 4 Collier f1 70.68, at 1334.
50a. It may also be suggested that real property is not so amenable to
rapid transfer, that real estate transactions are generally more formal and less
numerous than transactions involving personal property. All this may be true,
but it does not necessarily follow that statutory liens on realty are endowed
with a higher degree of legal integrity than statutory liens or personalty.
51. See Leary, Horse and Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles,
96 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 455, 469 n. 36 (1948).
52. See Comment, 48 Yale L. J. 1238 (1939) ; cf. McDougal and Brab-
ner-Smith, Land Title Transfer: A Regression, 48 Yale L. J. 1125, 1126, 1150
(1939).
53. See, e.g., 1 Thompson, Real Property § 56 (Perm. ed. 1939).
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for the drastically different treatment of stautory liens on personalty
as compared with such liens on realty do not appear to be sub-
stantial enough to warrant the necessity of drawing the troublesome
distinction in bankruptcy. 54
Immunity for Possessory Liens
It is true that liens on personalty are also excepted from impair-
ment by Section 67c to the extent that they are accompanied by
possession. The talismanic power of possession in the law is
familiar enough to the layman. Does the deference accorded posses-
sion here have a rational foundation? All liens were once posses-
sory: the original lien was no more than a personal right of one in
possession of personalty to detain the property until satisfaction of a
debt or demand arising in connection with the property.i The de-
velopment of the lien concept may not have been logical,5 6 but the
term today has no such miserly meaning as that suggested by its
origin. 57 The necessities of modem economy could not be adequately
served by a legal view that would require the lienor to have posses-
sion of chattel security. 5s If recognition of the validity of common
law liens in bankruptcy continues to be sound as a matter of general
policy,"9 then possessory liens created by statute are surely entitled
to no less respect. 0 The refusal, however, to accord comparable
54. The necessity of drawing the distinction is likely to arise whenever
a statutory lien unaccompanied by possession purports to attach to all prop-
erty of the debtor of whatever kind. See, e.g., In re Ann Arbor Brewing Co.,
110 F. Supp. 111 (E.D. Mich. 1951). A state statutory lien securing an ad
valorem tax on personalty is thus valid against the trustee in bankruptcy to
the extent the lien attaches to realty but, unless accompanied by possession, is
subject to postponement under § 67c insofar as it attaches to the personal
property taxed. It would not appear to matter that under state law the lien
against the personalty is accorded preferential treatment. Cf. Wilberg v.
Yakima County, 132 Wash. 219, 231 Pac. 931 (1925).
55. Whitaker, The Law of Lien and Stoppage in Transitu 2 (1816);
Montagu, A Summary of the Law of Lien 3 (1824).
56. Gavit, Under the Lien Theory of Mortgages Is the Mortgage Only
a Power of Sale?, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 147, 149 (1931).
57. 1 Jones, Liens § 3 (3d ed. 1914) ; cf. Restatement, Security 157-159
(1941). The term "lien" is used in this article, as it is used in the Bankruptcy
Act, to refer to the interest of a secured creditor. Note, 17 Minn. L. Rev. 47
(1932).
58. See Glenn, The Chattel Mortgage as a Statutory Security, 25 Va. L.
Rev. 316, 320 (1939) ; Gilmore and Axelrod, Chattel Security: I, 57 Yale
L. J. 517 (1948); Gilmore, Chattel Security: II, 57 Yale L. J. 761 (1948).
59. See note 2a supra. Common-law liens may conceivably fall within
the condemnation of § 60, the preference section. See Note, 3 Stan. L. Rev.
711, 722 (1951) ; 4 Collier 1 67.20[2], at 183.
60. Since, unlike common-law liens, statutory liens accompanied by
possession are expressly exempted from application of § 60, there is actually
a discrimination against possessory common-law liens in bankruptcy. Cf.
Goggin v. Bank of America Nat Trust & Say. Ass'n, 183 F. 2d 322, 327
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 877 (1950). The contributor of the Stanford
Law Review Note cited in the previous footnote observes that a particular
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treatment to statutory liens on personalty which have been perfected
under state law as against subsequent bona fide purchasers and
levying creditors by compliance with notice-filing or recordation
requirements is anachronistic."'
Is any legitimate bankruptcy purpose served when one statutory
lien is saved because accompanied by possession and another,
equally effective under state and federal nonbankruptcy law, is
impaired? Traditionally of course the taking of possession by a
lienor has given effective legal notice to the owner's creditors of the
specific claim of the lienor. The development of chattel mortgages,
conditional sales, and trust receipts, as well as of nonpossessory
statutory liens, has proceeded too far, however, for creditors today
to expect to be apprised of encumbrances against their debtors'
property by transfers of possession. Effective means of affording
notice which save to the debtor-owner the economic advantage o
possession and at the same time are less equivocal 62 in signifying an
encumbrance than possession in the lienor have been evolved and
are accorded full recognition elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Act.6 3
That subdivision c cannot be justified as a measure designed to pro-
tect unsecured creditors against the deceptive appearances of re-
lien arising by operation of law may be preferential in one state and not in
another because only in that latter has the lien law been codified. His point
that the policy justification for insulating statutory liens from § 60 may be no
stronger than the considerations that pertain to common-law liens is well taken.
61. The incongruity of the distinction based on possession vel non is
demonstrated by considering its impact on statutory liens which can be per-
fected either by recordation or by possession. Examples of such liens maybe found in Kan. Gen. Stat. § 58-201 (1949) (artisan's lien) ; Ore. Rev. Stat.§§ 87.085-87.120 (1953) (artisan's lien) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 87.325, 87.505
et seq. (1953) (agister's lien). If the lienor chooses the right method of per-
fection, his lien will withstand attack by the trustee in bankruptcy. Althoughit is a matter of indifference to creditors under state law, if the lienor chooses
to record rather than to possess, he will suffer the penalties of § 67c.
62. Even "the word 'possession' drips with ambiguity." City of New
York v. Hall, 139 F. 2d 935, 936 (2d Cir. 1944). Cf. Wolfe, The Correlation
of Liens and Priorities, 27 Temp. L. Q. 268 (1953), 28 J. N. A. Ref. Bankr.
104 (1954).
63. Secret liens may be attacked by the trustee in bankruptcy under8§ 60, 67d, 70c, and 70e. The statute of limitations does not run against the
trustee under the first two of the cited provisions until the lien has been
perfected as against subsequent bona fide purchasers or ordinary levying
creditors. The test is one requiring reference to nonbankruptcy law. The two
subdivisions of § 70 accept the validity of liens if perfected under nonbank-
ruptcy law as against creditors. No special consideration is accorded liens per-
fected by possession except as nonbankruptcy law may require. Section 70c
formerly distinguished between property of the bankrupt in his possession at
the date of bankruptcy and property not so held. The trustee in bank-
ruptcy was given the lien of a levying creditor only as to the property in
possession. By virtue of amendments in 1950 and 1952 the trustee's lien ex-
tends to all property of the bankrupt, whether or not in his possession at
bankruptcy. 64 Stat. 26 (1950) ; 66 Stat. 430 (1952).
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tention of possession by the debtor' is apparent from the fact that
possession taken of personalty by a statutory lienor on the eve
of bankruptcy is effective to immunize the lien as against the
trustee under the subdivision.61'
It may be suggested that a lien accompanied by possession can
be differentiated from other liens in that it has somehow reached a
stage closer to absolute and complete transfer, that it is a more
drastic measure to disturb the lien of one in possession than a non-
possessory lien.66 The suggestion is hardly based on better than
metaphysical considerations and involves a disregard of the criteria
established by nonbankruptcy law for determining perfection of
liens and an indifference to the economic advantages of permitting
the debtor to retain the possession and use of encumbered property.
Testimony recently given at a. Congressional hearing emphasized
the tendency of a rule which puts a premium on seizure of a debtor's
property to precipitaie bankruptcy in situations where forebearance
by the lienor would have permitted the debtor to extricate himself
from financial difficulty.67 A rule which increases bankruptcies re-
quires a strong justification.
Congressional committee reports disclose that liens securing
indebtedness, accumulated as a result of long indulgence by tax
64. Mr. Justice Burton suggested in Goggin v. Division of Labor Law
Enforcement of Cal., 336 U. S. 118, 127-129 (1949), that public warning of the
existence of the lien was the purpose of the possession requirement of § 67c.
The opinion contained an implication that notice filing serves this purpose
of the subdivision but discloses no awareness that this mode of perfection is
ineffectual to protect a lienor under the subdivision. The suggestion of a
purpose to require public notoriety has been criticized as incompatible with
the primary objective of § 67c to implement the policy of § 64. Note, 62 Yale
L. J. 1131, 1135 (1953).
65. Section 67c "speaks as of the time of the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy." Goggin v. Division of Labor Law Enforcement, 336 U. S. 118
(1949). Compare the suggestion of Judge Frank in City of New York v. Hall,
139 F. 2d 935, 936 (2d Cir. 1944), that the lienor to prevail under § 67c
"must adequately warn potential petitioning creditors of the existence of the
lien." The point of warning them is not entirely clear. Should they not be
warned in like manner of the existence of liens on realty?
66. Possession of property at bankruptcy by a lienor or by any person
other than the bankrupt has been regarded of sufficient moment to entitle him
generally to insist on a plenary tria. of issues arising out of his claims against
the property. 2 Collier f1 23.04. This deference to persons in possession has
become considerably diminished as a result of recent amendments of the Act.
Summary jurisdiction of actions to avoid liens of judicial proceedings under
§ 67a was granted by the Chandler Act without respect to who has possession.
See 4 Collier ff 67.18. The amendment of 1952 requires the lienor in possession
to interpose timely objection to the exercise of summary jurisdiction. 66 Stat.
421, amending § 2a(7). See also -the reference to recent changes of § 70c
in note 63 =spra. It is one thing, however, to afford certain procedural safe-
guards to lienors in possession and quite another to immunize their liens from
challenge by the trustee in any kind of proceeding.
67. See Hearing, mipra note 39, at 7, 17, 22. See also H. R. Rep. No.
2212, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1954).
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authorities and landlords, loomed as a serious evil in the minds of
the draftsmen of the Chandler Act of 1938.68 The taking of posses-
sion by a statutory lienor is frequently a first and may be the final
step in the enforcement of the lien. It may be suggested, therefore,
that subdivision c discourages dilatoriness in the enforcement of
statutory liens by putting a premium on the acquisition of possession
before bankruptcy.63 The suggestion can hardly be more than a
makeweight or afterthought. If accumulations are the problem, they
can and should be attacked directly, as they are in respect to wage
and rent liens.7 0 In any event the tax liens and other kinds of statu-
tory liens that secure accumulating liabilities are most likely to
agglomerate against land, buildings, fixtures, and such real assets.71
Such liens are of course not touched by Section 67c.
Immunity of Liens Enforced by Sale
The least objectionable of the saving clauses in Section 67c of
the Chandler Act is that pertaining to liens enforced by sale before
bankruptcy. Ordinarily, of course, a lien enforced by sale is no
longer a lien, since the purchaser takes the property discharged of
the lien.72 The Supreme Court, however, recently recognized that a
tax lien foreclosed by sale was nevertheless too inchoate and
general to prevail as against the federal priority under Section 3466
of the Revised Statutes.7 3 Such a lien would seem to be one pre-
served against the trustee by the language of Section 67c, whether
real or personal property is involved and irrespective of who had
possession at bankruptcy. Whatever the propriety of the Supreme
Court's view of the effect of the federal priority statute, no reason
appears why a statutory lienor who has proceeded so far as to
68. See Committee Report Analysis, supra note 32, at 212; H. R. Rep.
No. 1409 on H. R. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1937).
69. "Notwithstanding the admonition of Section 67, sub. c, the City
chose to slumber on its rights. Congress intended to penalize such somnolence."
City of New York v. Hall, 139 F. 2d 935, 936 (2d Cir. 1944).
70. See note 20 supra. The National Bankruptcy Conference and other
groups have been long engaged in an effort to limit the take of taxing
authorities from bankrupt estates. See Moore and Tone, supra note 16, at
699-703; Special Report of Harry S. Gleick, Chairman of the Committee on
Bankruptcy of the A. B. A. Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law, The Business Lawyer, Nov. 1954, p. 82.
71. Most tax liens and many other statutory liens attach exclusively
to realty or to both realty and personalty. 1 Jones, Liens § 97 et seq. (3d ed.
1914). The relatively greater permanence of realty contributes to the result
described in the text.
72. Cf. Brown, Personal Property §§ 119, 125 (1936). If the effect of a
sale enforcing a lien were no more than an assignment of the lien to the pur-
chaser, then the property would remain indefinitely subject to redemption.
The utility of chattel security would be seriously impaired by such a con-
dition.
73. United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U. S. 361 (1953).
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enforce his lien by sale should submit to postponement or other
impairment of his interest for the sake of paying any unsecured
claim in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding.
Circuity of Priority
Every piece of legislation enacted to take care of old difficulties
creates new difficulties of its own. One largely unanticipated diffi-
culty attributable to the new Section 67c of the Chandler Act was
that it inflicted on the courts the task of dealing with the judicially
insoluble problem of circuity of priority. The normal rule74 for
determining the relative priority of valid liens, in bankruptcy as well
as out, is that "first in time is first in right."75 Except when govern-
ing legislation provides otherwise, the rule applies to statutory liens,
including those created by federal as well as state law.7 6 Section 67c
explicitly provided for a special order of priority for certain statu-
tory liens vis-d-vis two classes of unsecured claims77 but said nothing
about their relation to other valid liens. Such other liens might be
second in time yet valid as against the trustee in bankruptcy; or they
might be first in time and valid against the trustee yet be inferior
in right under nonbankruptcy law, which frequently accords special
priority to statutory liens.7 8 The perplexities that arise may best
be appreciated by a consideration of a series of situations.
Let it be supposed that the bankrupt owns personalty valued
at $5,000. It is subject to a federal tax lien unaccompanied by posses-
74. This rule is recognized in the Roman law, Radin, Roman Law 207(1927) ; in continental civil law, Brissaud, A History of French Private Law
617 (1912); and in Anglo-American common law and equity, 4 American
Law of Property §§ 17.1-17.2 (1952).
75. "The principle is believed to be universal, that a prior lien gives
a prior claim, which is entitled to prior satisfaction, out of the subject it
binds, unless the lien be intrinsically defective, or be displaced by some act of
the party holding it, which shall postpone him in a Court of law or equity to
a subsequent claimant." Chief Justice Marshall in Rankin & Schatzell v.
Scott, 12 Wheat 177, 179 (U.S. 1827). The rule is an inarticulate assumption
in almost every case involving priority of encumbrances.
For application of the rule in bankruptcy see, e.g., In re Caswell Const.
Co., 13 F. 2d 667 (N.D. N.Y. 1926). The same rule has prevailed since 1938
insofar as the Chandler Act has not changed the law. it re Taylorcraft Avia-
tion Corp., 168 F. 2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948), 35 Iowa L. Rev. 490, 24 J. N. A.
Ref. Bankr. 132 (1950); In re Van Winkle, 49 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Ky.
1943). But cf. United States v. Reese, 131 F. 2d 466 (7th Cir. 1942), where
the court failed to distinguish (1) priorities from liens and (2) bankruptcy
legislation from the law applicable to nonbankruptcy liquidation.
76. United States v. New Britain, 347 U. S. 81, 85-86 (1954).
77. I.e., those for costs of administration and wages under § 64a(1)
and (2).
78. See, e.g., Kan. Gen. Stat. § 58-203 et seq. (1949) (thresherman's
and cornhusker's lien "preferred to that of any prior chattel mortgage or en-
cumbrance") ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 85.17 (1943) (lien for race track supplies
"superior to any and all claims, liens and mortgages, whether recorded' or
not); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 12.560 (1951) (lien for breeding service prior to
"all other liens and encumbrances upon the offspring").
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sion and an indefeasible 79 attachment lien, each securing a $4,000
claim. The federal tax lien is apparently superior in its entirety to
the attachment lien, irrespective of the chronology of the commence-
ment of the liens.80 If claimants entitled to priority under clauses
(1) and (2) of Section 64a have claims totaling $4,000, any of the
following results is plausible in bankruptcy:-
(1) Since the Bankruptcy Act nowhere in terms permits
impairment of the attachment lien, it is inferable that it is
entitled to be a first charge against the fund derived from the
property. With respect to the remainder, the Bankruptcy Act
clearly postpones the Government to the claims entitled to
priority. The attachment lienor, who may be designated as A,
would thus receive $4,000; the priority claimants, identified col-
lectively as P, would take the balance of $1,000; and the Govern-
ment (G) would take nothing.81
(2) Another solution assumes that subordination of a su-
perior lien also subordinates an inferior lien. In the case sup-
posed, P, i.e., the group of claimants coming within Section 64a
(1) and (2), may be ranked first. The Government (G) would
then take the $1,000 remainder, leaving the attachment creditor
(A) nothing.8 2
(3) A third solution is to reason that P is entitled to no more
than $1,000 of the proceeds of the property since the Bankruptcy
Act does not postpone the $4,000 attachment lien to priority
claims. As between G and A, nevertheless, G is entitled to
79. Le., under § 67a. Section 67c does not, of course, purport to deal
with any other than statutory liens and liens for distress of rent whether
statutory or not.
80. United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U. S. 47 (1950);
United States v. Acri, 348 U. S. 211 (1955).
81. This result, believed to be the only sound one possible under the
statute, was reached in New Orleans v. Harrell, 134 F. 2d 399 (5th Cir.
1943), sustaining priority of a chattel mortgage in bankruptcy as against a
city tax lien which fell within the subordinating language of § 67c. The
concurring opinion is particularly pertinent: "Nor may the City be heard
to say that though subordinated by the statute to the two priorities, nothing in
the statute purports to subordinate it to the mortgage lien which but for the
bankruptcy it would have primed. Such claim is completely answered by the
consideration that since the mortgage lien is not, and City's lien is, subordi-
nated to these two priorities, the City's claim must be subordinate to the
mortgage." Id. at 402.
82. This solution, like the first, avoids circuity of priority and the at-
tendant uncertainties which are the concomitant of circuity. It is the rule
generally supposed to be followed in circuity situations by the Pennsylvania
courts. 4 American Laiv of Property 625 (1952) ; Osborne, Mortgages 533(1951). It is subject to the criticism here that it accords the priorities
superiority over the attachment lien without authority derivable from the
language or context of the Act and without justification from its purpose.
Moreover, it is capable of particularly unfortunate results. Suppose in our
example the Government tax lien was for only $100 and the priority claims
under § 64a(1) and (2) totaled $4,900. Although the attachment lienor's
claim is superior to all save the $100 lien, he would, nevertheless, be com-
pletely cut out by this solution.
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priority to the full extent of its $4,000 lien. A is again squeezed
out, but G this time gets the lion's share of $4,000.83
(4) A and P may get together on the argument, however,
that since outside of bankruptcy the attachment lienor could ex-
pect to receive $1,000, he should receive that much in bank-
ruptcy. G on the other hand is not entitled to retain the $4,000
remainder as against P, whose claims will absorb the entire re-
mainder to the complete exclusion of G.84
(5) A court may, however, find neither of the proffered
solutions satisfactory and come up with this Solomonic judg-
ment: Outside of bankruptcy A would be entitled to $1,000 of
the proceeds of the property, and nothing in the Act can be said
to improve or derogate from his position in respect to that part
of his claim. On the other hand, if the attachment lien were
to be fully enforced, as it might be against unsecured creditors,
83. This adjustment conforms to a rule frequently applied, and still
more frequently urged, for resolving conflicts of priority. See 4 American
Law of Property 625-626- (1952-) Comment, 36 Yale L. J. 129, 135 (1926) ;
43 Harv. L. Rev. 146 (1929) ; cf. Blair, The Priority of the United States
in Equity Receivership, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 29, 33 (1925).
In allowing G to be subrogated to the position of A, this solution accords
priority to G over P as well as A, thereby defeating the objective of § 67c
to subordinate statutory liens on personality to the first and second priorities.
At the same time, without statutory authorization, it postpones A to both
G and P, protecting P against indirect attack by G at the expense of A. See
Campbell, Protection Against Indirect Attack, in Harvard Legal Essays 3,
17-19 (1934) ; Osborne, Mortgages 534-535 (1951).
84. This method of disposition, following the same principle as that
employed in the third solution, nevertheless appears to effectuate more closely
the objective of § 67c. Yet, in allowing P to be subrogated to the postion of G,
it nullifies the priority of G over the attachment lien. This pattern of distri-
bution was employed in In re Empire Granite Co., 42 F. Supp. 450, 458-459
(M.D. Ga. 1942), involving state tax liens subordinated under § 67c and a
chattel mortgage inferior to the tax liens by state law. The method is ap-
proved in Feigenbaum, Tax Problems, 25 J. N. A. Ref. Bankr. 107, 111
(1951), reprinted under the title, The Bankruptcy Triangle: Creditor-Debtor-
Commissioner, 30 Taxes 448, 456 (1952). Although Empire Granite was im-
pliedly overruled by New Orleans v. Harrell, 134 F. 2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943),
discussed in note 81 supra, the same method of distribution was employed in
California State Dep't of Employment v. United States, 210 F. 2d 242 (9th
Cir. 1954), and approved in Seligson, Recent Developments in the Field of
Federal Tax Claims, 29 J. N. A. Ref. Bankr. 7 (1955). Cf. United States v.
New Britain, 347 U. S. 81, 88 (1954).
The effect of application of the formula here under consideration is the
same as if the trustee were empowered to preserve the postponable lien of the
Government for the benefit of the claimants entitled to first and second
priority. While it is arguable as a matter of policy that the trustee should
have power to preserve the lien, the lack of such power would seem to be the
irresistible inference from the absence of any express grant of it when considered
against the fact that Congress has in five places in the Bankrupty Act ex-
plicitly authorized preservation of other kinds of voidable transfers, including
liens. See §§ 60b (preferential lien or security title), 67a(3) (lien acquired
through judicial proceedings), 67c (excess of restricted lien for wages or rent
and lien invalid under clause (2)), 67d(6) (fraudulent transfer or obliga-
tion), and 70e(3) (transfer or obligation voidable under nonbankruptcy law).
For an argument that a trustee under the Act of 1938 had no general power
of subrogation to voidable liens see Sachs, Trustee's Rights of Subrogation
to Creditor's Liens, 15 J. N. A. Ref. Bankr. 105 (1941).
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there would be but $1,000 for distribution to P. Giving A and P
the $1,000, which is all that each can expect in view of other
superior claims to the property, $3,000 would remain for dis-
tribution to G.85
(6) But why should G end up with $2,000 more than P?
That certainly fails to regard the objective of Section 67c. Would
not a superior solution limit G's original share to what it would
take as a junior lienholder after P. i.e., $1,000? The remaining
$2,000 could then be divided equally among the three classes of
claimants.86
Six solutions thus produce six differing nets for the parties in a
fairly simple situation presenting circuity. But if the problem of cir-
cuity of priority is imported into the Act, there is no demonstrably
correct solution-none beyond criticism.8 s
Another novel feature introduced into bankruptcy by the Chan-
dler Act's Section 67c was the provision in its second clause for re-
85. Just as much logic of course supports the following disposition: A is
entitled to $1,000 in bankruptcy as before, i.e., to the remainder after deducting
from the whole fund the amount of the paramount Government lien of $4,000.
By the same token G is entitled to the $1,000 remaining after deduction of$4,000 in priority claims of first and second rank. By thus paying over $2,000
to A and G in fulfillment of their expectations in bankruptcy as junior lien
claimants, the court has $3,000 left for application to the priority claims of
P. But G and P may likewise be regarded as junior encumbrancers entitled to$1,000 each, leaving $3,000 for A, the attachment creditor.
This pattern for distribution follows the "Dixon formula." The formula
has been widely approved. 4 American Law of Property 627-629 (1952);
Campbell, op. cit. supra note 83, at 17-18 (1934) ; Osborne, Mortgages 534,
539 (1951) ; cf. A. K[ocourek], A First-Rate Legal Puzzle-A Problem in
Priorities, 29 Ill. L. Rev. 952, 957 (1935). When no party is at fault, however,
as in the supposed case in the text, it furnishes no starting point, and the re-
sults vary arbitrarily as different starting points are used. Note, 38 Col. L.
Rev. 1267, 1269 (1938).
Another criticism that may be noted in respect to the formula is that the
proportion each person takes varies as the fund' increases or decreases. Thus,
if the fund should be $4,000, G, P, or A, depending on the starting point,
would take the entire sum and the other claimants would go without any-
thing. If the sum involved should be $6,000, each would take $2,000, wherever
the circle is started. A larger sum would increase the share of two of the
claimants and reduce that of the third party. See Osborne, Mortgages 535
(1951) ; White, A Problem in Priorities, 25 Ohio L. Bull. and Rep. 116,
119-121 (1926).
86. This distribution follows the proposal made by Professor Benson in
Circuity of Lien---A Problem in Priorities, 19 Minn. L. Rev. 139 (1935). The
same result would be reached by other routes proposed in A. K[ocourek],
supra note 85, and a Note, 38 Col. L. Rev. 1267 (1938). In other situations, how-
ever, the method proposed in the Note last cited avoids the result common to
b9th the Dixon and Benson formulae of yielding less to one claimant as the
fund increases.
87. Seven methods of solution of circuity problems are discussed in
Osborne, Mortgages 532-539 (1951). Nor does his list purport to be e-xhaus-
tive. See also 4 American Law of Property § 17.33 (1952) ; A. K[ocourek],
supra note 85.
The desirability of avoiding the legal tangles of circular priority where
possible was acknowledged in H. R. Rep. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 14(1952), discussing a proposed amendment of § 67c. Cf. Kennedy and Brooks,
Ten Years of Creditors Rights in Iowa, 38 Iowa L. Rev. 410, 434-437 (1953).
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striction on the amount of payment of certain liens. The liens so
restricted were "such liens for wages or for rent,"i.e., statutory liens
for wages or rent which were on personal property, unaccompanied
by possession and not enforced by sale, and liens of distress for
rent. Inasmuch as this restriction was intended to benefit unsecured
creditors rather than lienors, however, the subsection provided
that "as against other liens" the restriction should not apply.88 Now,
curiously, only this provision seems to have excited concern about
the importation of the problem of circuity of priority into bank-
ruptcy administration. 9
THE 1952 AMENDMENT OF SECTION 67c
The Thrust at Circuity
The Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary which ac-
companied the bill that became the 1952 amendment observed that
the exception "as against other liens" made it difficult to avoid a
construction "which would introduce a self-created circuity of
lien." 90 The committee's explanation of how this particular phrase,
rather than the postponement provision, generates a self-created
circuity is difficult to follow.9 '
88. Weinstein, op. cit. supra note 32, at 145 (1938).
89. See Hanna and MacLachlan, The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as
Amended with Annotations 96 (4th ed. 1951). The editors here appeared to be
concerned about the circuity problem only to the extent that it may arise in
connection with the provision for restriction "except as against other liens."
They assumed that an amendment deleting the exception "would meet this
difficulty."
90. H. R. Rep. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1952).
91. The report undertakes to illustrate: "Since junior liens [junior to
what?] are senior to the rights of general creditors, the subdivision would
seem to provide that the trustee in bankruptcy could prevail over the specific
lien claimant [meaning wage or rent lien claimant?] with reference to the
restrictable excess, but the junior lien claimant [junior to whom?], out-
ranking the trustee as the representative of general creditors with reference to
this property, could thus claim it, only to lose it back to the specific lien
claimant, whose lien is unrestricted as against other liens." Ibid.
"Junior liens" could be liens which are subordinated by the first part of
§ 67c and are inferior because subsequent in time to a wage or rent lien that
is both subordinated and restricted by the subsection. For even as to the liens
subordinated by § 67c, the bankruptcy court must depend on nonbankruptcy
law for the rules on marshalling such liens. 4 Collier ff 67.27[3], at 296;
Note, 62 Yale L. J. 1131, 1132 n. 11 (1953). The exception "as against other
liens" could thus be applied to such liens without incurring any contact with
the problem of circuity. The passage must, therefore, use "junior liens" in a
different sense, i.e., liens inferior under applicable lien law which are not,
however, subordinated in terms by the first part of Section 67c. No problem
of circuity arises with respect to such liens either, if they are regarded as not
postponed by this subsection of the Act. In order for a problem of circuity
to be created, §67c must be viewed as subordinating not only the liens par-
ticularly described therein but also, to some extent at least, those liens junior
under nonbankruptcy lien law to the subordinated liens. This is the circuity
discussed in the text. Even so, however, the quoted passage remains unin-
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In any event Congress on July 7, 1952,92 undertook to remove
the "self-created" difficulty by amending the subdivision. As thus
amended, Section 67c now reads:
"c. Where not enforced by sale before the filing of a petition
initiating a proceeding under this Act, and except where the
estate of the bankrupt is solvent: (1) though valid against the
trustee under subdivision b of this section, statutory liens, in-
cluding liens for taxes or debts owing to the United States or to
any State or any subdivision thereof, on personal property not
accompanied by possession of such property, and liens, whether
statutory or not, of distress for rent shall be postponed in pay-
ment to the debts specified in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision
a of section 64 of this Act and such liens for wages or for rent
shall be restricted in the amount of their payment to the same
extent as provided for wages and rent respectively in subdivi-
sion a of section 64 of this Act; and (2) the provisions of sub-
division b of this section to the contrary notwithstanding, statu-
tory liens created or recognized by the laws of any State for
debts owing to any person, including any State or any subdivi-
sion thereof, on personal property not accompanied by possession
of, or by levy upon or by sequestration or distraint of, such
property, shall not be valid against the trustee: Provided, how-
ever, That so much of clause (1) of this subdivision c as restricts
liens for wages and rent and clause (2) of this subdivision c
shall not apply in proceedings under chapter X of this Act, un-
less an order shall be entered therein directing that bankruptcy
be proceeded with, or in proceedings under section 77 of this
Act. The court may on due notice order so much of any lien
in excess of the restricted amount under clause (1) and any
lien invalid under clause (2) of this subdivision c to be pre-
served for the benefit of the estate and, in any such event, such
lien for the excess and such invalid lien, as the case may be,
shall pass to the trustee."
The legislative purpose was thought to be achieved by eliminating
the phrase, "except as against other liens," and providing for preser-
vation of the wage or rent lien for any excess over the restricted
amount, such preservation to be for the benefit of the estate. 93 The
wage-and-rent-lien restriction is no longer affected by the presence
or absence of other liens. Where, however, the restriction would
redound to the benefit of some other lienor-the United States as a
tax lienor, for example, the bankruptcy court may on due notice
telligible as an interpretation of the "except" phrase, since there was under
the statute that included the phrase no restriction or restrictable excess so
long as there were other liens which would benefit from the restriction. How
then, when the exception applied, could the trustee be said to prevail, or thejunior lienor to have or lose a claim, as to the restrictable excess?
92. 66 Stat. 427-428.
93. H. R. Rep. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1952). See also Hanna
and MacLachlan, op. cit. supra note 40, at 97.
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order the excess of the restricted lien to be preserved so that it may
pass to the estate.94
With deference it is suggested that while the amendment effects
a desirable change, it did nct accomplish the elimination of the
"legal tangle" of circular priority. The most serious problem of
circuity which can arise and has arisen under Section 67c 5 was not
touched. It did overrule In re Eakin Lumber Co.,96 decided in 1941,
where a wage lien was held to be unrestricted because the restriction
would redound to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, holding
a junior lien as a pledgee. The unsecured creditors were thus cut out
because of the presence of the junior lien. The House Report ac-
companying the bill which became the 1952 amendment pointed out
that such a result not only meant that the policy of Section 67c was
being "inadequately implemented," but it presented to a trustee the
unseemly question of whether the latter's lien would be extinguished
at a discount in order that the wage (or rent) lien might be subject
to restriction. 97 By deleting the exception the draftsmen of the 1952
amendment eliminated the question.
Priorities Labelled as "Liens" and "Floating Liens"
The most noteworthy change effected by the 1952 amendment
to Section 67c, however, was the invalidation against the trustee, by
a new clause (2), of statutory liens created9 by state law for debts
on personal property unaccompanied by possession, levy, sequestra-
tion, or distraint of the property. Since liens for taxes or debts are
referred to in clause (1) of the new subdivision which provides for
postponement, it may be inferred that tax liens are not invalidated
by clause (2), although liens for debts owing any state or subdivi-
sion thereof are explicitly nullified. 9 At all events federal tax liens
94. See Sen. Rep. No. 1395, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 8 (1952).
95. See notes 81-86 supra.
96. 39 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. W.Va. 1941), aff'd, s b nora. RFC v. Sun
Lbr. Co., 126 F. 2d 731 (4th Cir. 1942).
97. H. R. Rep. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1952).
98. The statute invalidates liens of the kind described if "created or
recognized" by state law. The use of the word "recognized" here is confusing
and probably unnecessary. 4 Collier 1 67.231, at 311-312. Federal statutory
liens are necessarily recognized by state law but they are surely not intended
to be invalidated by such circumlocution. A helpful interpretation is sug-
gested by Hanna, Preferences as Affected by Section 60c and 67b of the
Bankruptcy Law, 25 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 12, 24 J. N. A. Ref. Bankr. 115, 118
(1950) (liens "recognized" by state law deemed to be those arising by impli-
cation from legislation rather than "created" by explicit terms).
99. It is to be noted, however, that by § 1(14) of the Act, "unless the
same be inconsistent with the context," "'debt shall include any debt, de-
mand, or claim provable in bankruptcy. . . ." Tax claims are provable in
bankruptcy. 3 Collier ff 63.26. Seztion 64, which confers priority on taxes,
purports to deal only with debts. Moreover, "debts" as used in Rev. Stat.
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clearly are not invalidated by the new clause.100
The avowed legislative purpose of the invalidation provision was
"more fully to implement the policy of the Chandler Act."''1 The
Chandler Act sought to improve the position of unsecured creditors.
Pursuant to this purpose, Section 64 was amended by that Act by
deleting the priority theretofore given to a multiplicity of priorities
created or recognized by state laws. If a state could fasten the label
of "lien" on what had been called a priority, however, it could
frustrate the objective of the Chandler Act's amendment of Sec-
tion 64, and it has been suggested that there is a trend in state
statutes to label as "liens" what are "essentially priorities."1 0 2 The
new amendment views a state-created statutory lien on personalty
unaccompanied by possession, levy, sequestration, or distraint as
not significantly different from a priority by striking down the lien
as the Chandler Act did the priority. Indeed, a state statutory lien
for rent is treated more harshly than a state priority, which is
recognized under Section 64a(5) to the extent of rent accrued
within three months of bankruptcy. 10 3
Whether or not the new invalidation provision is desirable, the
identification of state legal provisions for priority with state statu-
tory provisions for liens on personalty unaccompanied by possession,
levy, sequestration, or distraint does not appear to be well taken. On
the one band statutory liens on realty and liens on personalty per-
§ 3466 (1875), 31 U. S. C. § 191 (1952), includes taxes. Price v. United States,
269 U. S. 492 (1926).
Apparently the only ruling on the point to date is that of Referee Katcher
in Matter of Gordon, 27 J. N. A. Ref. Bankr. 85 (E.D. Mich. 1952), invalidat-
ing as against the trustee city, county, and state tax liens on personalty un-
accompanied by possession or process. The ruling is reported to have been
subsequently vacated, and the case presumably has since been settled without
the necessity for final determination of the matter. Hearing, supra note 39,
at 6. The ruling nevertheless prodded representatives of state and local taxing
authorities to seek an amendment of § 67c(2) which would eliminate any
doubt as to the inapplicability of the invalidation provision to tax liens. A
bill, H. R. 5796, would have inserted the following language parenthetically
and immediately following the word "debts" in § 67c(2) : "as distinguished
from statutory liens for taxes." The bill passed the House but died in the
Senate. Although the National Bankruptcy Conference took the position that
the amendment was unnecessary in view of the context, the phraseology of the
bill that passed the House followed the recommendation of the Conference.
Id. at 26.
100. The sweeping statement in Sen. Rep. No. 1395, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
8 (1952), that "the bill strengthens the provisions of Section 67c by rendering
a statutory lien invalid as against the trustee" plainly disregards the limita-
tions in the invalidation clause itself.
101. H. R. Rep. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1952).
102. Weinstein, Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act as Proposed and
Pending Before the Congress, 24 J. N. A. Ref. Bankr. 28, 32 (1950) ; H. R.
Rep. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
103. 4 Collier ff 67.23, at 234.
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fected in particular ways are invulnerable. On the other hand liens
on personalty not so perfected are utterly annulled. It has been
said by way of explanation for the difference:
"A lien upon real estate is commonly dealt with adequately by
recording acts and there is no confusion caused by fluctuation of
the subject matter to which it relates. Liens on personal prop-
erty unaccompanied by possession, however, are of the nature of
'floating liens,' which attach to all a debtor's personalty, al-
though the property he owns is commonly changing from day to
day."'0 4
The statement's description is accurate as to certain personal prop-
erty liens, e.g., the federal tax lien under Section 6321 of the Internal
Revenue Code.105 Without explanation, however, this particular
brand of tax lien on personalty unaccompanied by possession or any
other designated mode of perfection is not subject to the invalidation
treatment. 08 One is left to the inference that opposition from the
gentlemen of the Treasury Department was effective. However,
there are liens that come within the invalidating provision that
cannot be called floating liens at all and should not be analogized to
mere priorities. They are as specific as a lien can be; they encumber
the property and follow it into the hand of third persons quite inde-
pendently of any insolvency or liquidation proceedings; and they
can be independently foreclosed or enforced.10 7
As a matter of fact the nature of a priority, as distinguished
from a lien, seems to have been misapprehended in the explanation
given for the 1952 amendment to Section 67c. A priority is no more
than a right to preference in the distribution of the assets of an
estate undergoing liquidation and can have no effect independently
of such a distribution. 08 The House Report accompanying the pro-
posed law stated that "If any provisions for priority were relabelled a
'lien,' such a lien would be indistinguishable from floating liens on
104. H. R. Rep. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1952).
105. Formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3670,
106. There is a conflict as to whether a federal tax lien not perfected by
notice filing pursuant to Int. Rev. Code § 6323 can prevail against the trustee
under § 70c. The crux of the controversy is whether a trustee can be said to
be such a "judgment creditor" as is protected by notice-filing of the federal
tax lien. 4 Collier if 67.2411] n. 6a, ff 67.26 n. 21 ; Seligson, supra note 84, at 11.
See also note 159 infra.
107. Examples of such liens may be found in Iowa Code c. 571 (1954)(thresherman's or cornsheller's lien) ; Minn. Stat. § 514.35 (1953) (garage
keeper's lien); N. J. Rev. Stat. § 2:60-21 (1937) (garage keeper's lien);
WVash. Rev. Code § 84.60.030 (1951) (personal property tax lien). The Min-
nesota lien was enforced as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser in Pratt
v. Armstrong, 192 Minn. 14, 255 N. W. 91, 100 A. L. R. 77 (1934), criticized
in 19 Minn. L. Rev. 469 (1935). The Washington tax lien, similarly enforce-
able, is discussed in a Note, 2 Wash. L. Rev. 186 (1927).
108. Strom v. Peikes, 123 F. 2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1941), noted in 51 Yale
L. J. 863 (1942) ; 4 Collier ff 67.20[9] ; Glenn, Liquidation 726 (1935).
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personal property."' 0 9 The accuracy of the observation, of course,
depends on what one means by "floating lien." The "floating charge"
of English law comes close indeed to being no more than a pri-
ority,110 but it is not clear from the context of the House Report
whether the "floating lien" is limited to the kind permitting the
debtor-owner to consume the property or to sell items free of the
lien, or may embrace every lien attaching to after-acquired prop-
erty. In any event the invalidation provision goes far beyond pro-
tecting the unsecured creditors against "floating liens," howsoever
defined, let alone liens that are no more than priorities in disguise."'
If state policy as embodied in state lien statutes is to be frustruated
by federal legislation, more care in drafting the federal statute and
explaining the federal policy seems desirable.
Selective Preservation of Liens
By the last sentence of the new subdivision the court may on
due notice order "any lien invalid under clause (2) of this subdivi-
sion to be preserved for the benefit of the estate." Coupled with the
provision in the same sentence, earlier alluded to,"12 whereby the
excess amount secured by a restricted wage or rent lien can like-
wise be brought into the general estate, the authorization for the
exercise of a preserving power by the bankruptcy court in Section
67c permits the policy of protecting unsecured creditors to be more
adequately realized and enables the court to avoid the troublesome
problem of circuity of priority insofar as restricted and invalidated
liens are concerned. As previously noted, however, 13 the situation
discussed earlier for which six solutions were ventured as legally
tenable under the Chandler Act appears in the same light under the
amendment of 1952, notwithstanding the legislative concern about
circuity of priority. As an original matter it would would seem that,
in the light of the language used and in the absence of any evidence
of Congressional intent or supposition to the contrary, only those
liens deliberately described in the subdivision are subordinated. 1 4
To subject to postponement other liens would extend a novel and
109. H. R. Rep. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1952).
110. See 3 Glenn, Mortgages § 426 (1943).
111. Statutory liens which do not become effective until the property has
come into the custody of a court or a liquidator for sale and distribution of
proceeds are indeed nothing but glorified priorities. Cf. United States v.
Knott 298 U. S. 544 (1936) ; United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U. S. 253, 260
(19235; Leggett v. Southeastern People's College, 234 N. C. 595, 600, 68
S. E. 2d 263, 268 (1951).
112. See the text accompanying notes 93-94, mtpra.
113. See text accompanying note 95 mrpra.
114. See note 81 supra.
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drastic remedy to achieve results not within the objectives or the
language of the legislation. To illustrate:
(1) Let it be supposed that an indefeasible attachment lien
is for $4,000 and the Government's tax lien is for $500.11 If the
personal property involved is worth only $4,000, it is using
Section 67c(1) with a vengeance to permit the priority claim-
ants to cut out the attachment lienor to any greater extent than
the $500 representing the amount of the subordinated tax lien. 110
(2) Suppose that personal property, subject to an indefeasible
$4,000 attachment lien and a tax lien in the same amount, is valued
at $10,000. If priority claims totalling $4,000 are first paid out of
the proceeds of the property and the Government takes the bal-
ance of $4,000 as the second claimant, then is Section 67c(1)
employed to subordinate, not the tax lien within its terms, but
the attachment lien, which outside of bankruptcy would have
been invulnerable to invasion by the Government's lien.
Even should the trustee be given the power to preserve subordi-
nated liens for the benefit of the estate or any part of it, the attach-
ment lien in this situation would be left intact by Section 67c. It may
be doubted, however, that the Act affords any basis for finding in
the statute as now drawn authority for subrogation to or preserva-
tion of a postponed lien postponed by Section 67c(1) .1 7 While
Congress has by the last sentence of Section 67c carefully extended
the power to preserve for the benefit of the estate certain liens and
portions of liens affected by the subdivision, it has not extended such
power with respect to the liens subordinated by clause (1) of Sec-
tion 67c. If the subordination of liens by contract, judicial proceed-
ings, common law, and statute (when accompanied by possession)
had been intended when they are junior by nonbankruptcy law to
liens that are postponed by Section 67c(1), the argument is persua-
sive that Congress would have provided for the preservation of any
lien postponed by clause (1) for the benefit of the claimants entitled
to priority under Section 64a.
THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE PROPOSAL
It thus appears that notwithstanding the improvements effected
by the 1952 amendment of Section 67c, the amendment did not take
115. Assuming as before that the Government tax lien is superior,
under applicable lien law, to the attachment lien but is of the type postponed
under § 67c(1). See note 80 supra and the accompanying text.
116. If the priority claims of § 64a(1) and (2) should total $3,500 or
more, the attachment lien would be cut out completely despite its superiority
to all save a $500 tax lien. See note 82 .upra.
117. But cf. In re Cofax Corp., 96 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. N.Y. 1951). See
also Seligson, supra note 84, at 11. Professor Seligson suggests the possible
availability of § 70e to the trustee as authority for avoiding an otherwise
indefeasible attachment lien which is inferior to a statutory lien invalid under
§ 70c. If the suggestion is sound, the five lien preservation provisions incorpo-
rated in the Act would seem unnecessary. See note 84 supra.
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care of some of the difficulties arising under the original version of
the subdivision and, on the other hand, imported into the Act some
new problems of its own. The National Bankruptcy Conference has
been aware of inadequacies in the treatment of statutory liens by
the Bankruptcy Act and since March of 1953 has had a committee
assigned to study and bring in a proposal for revision.118 At its
November, 1954, meeting the Conference approved in principle the
following draft :-9
"(1) This subdivision c does not apply to liens enforced by
a sale before the petition, does not apply to solvent bankrupt
estates, does not apply to property which cannot be sold in
bankruptcy for more than the amount of the liens upon it which
are indefeasible in bankruptcy, does not apply in proceedings
under Chapter X of the Act, unless an order has been entered
therein directing that bankruptcy be proceeded with, and does
not apply to proceedings under section 77 of the Act.
"(2) This second clause of this subdivision c does not apply
to tax liens created by statutes of the United States and does not
apply to liens for taxes owing to any state or subdivision thereof.
All statutory liens 20 (not hereinabove excluded) which first be-
come effective upon the insolvency of the debtor or upon execu-
tion upon or distribution or liquidation of the property of the
debtor, and all statutory general liens not hereinabove excluded,
as distinguished from statutory liens upon specified items of
property, shall be invalid against the trustee, even though valid
under subdivision b of this section; provided, however, that the
court may, on due notice, order any such lien to be preserved
for the benefit of the estate and in such event such invalid lien
118. National Bankruptcy Conference, Summary of Proceedings 7(1953).
119. National Bankruptcy Conference, Summary of Proceedings 7(1954).
120. The Summary of Conference Proceedings records a resolution
making a somewhat confusing change in the second sentence of clause (2)
"so that the words, 'All statutory liens' will read 'All statutory as distinguish-
ed from consensual liens and statutory liens.'"
It has been suggested that § 67b may be resorted to as a means of putting
trust receipts and perhaps other forms of consensual security beyond the
condemnation of § 60, the preference section. Hanna, Preferences as Affected
by Section 60c and Section 67b of the Bankruptcy Law, 25 Wash. L. Rev. 1,
24 J. N. A. Ref. Bankr. 115 (1950) ; Note, 3 Stan. L. Rev. 711 (1951) ; cf.
MacLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act,
4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 369, 394-395 (1937). The context would not seem to re-
quire the exclusion of consensual liens from the scope of § 67b and c any
more than it would require the exclusion of liens acquired through judicial
proceedings. Security for which a creditor has contracted does not fall
within the protection of § 67b or the condemnation of § 67c, whatever may be
the form or language of the agreement and whatever may be the effect of a
statute in regulating its validity, perfection, and enforcement. While vagrant
dicta may be found tending to lend support to the position taken in the first
two of the law review referees cited supra, no actual application of the
relevant provisions has been found to be inconsistent with the position taken
here. See 4 Collier I9 67.20[2], at 184-185.
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shall pass to the trustee. A lien not preserved but invalidated
against the trustee shall be invalid as against all liens indefeasible
in bankruptcy. Claims for wages or rent secured by liens
hereby invalidated or preserved shall be respectively admitted
and restricted as prior claims under clauses (2) and (5) of sec-
tion 64 subdivision a.
"(3) Although valid against a trustee under subdivision b
of this section, statutory liens for taxes or debts owing to the
United States, and for tax-es owing to any state or subdivision
thereof, of such a nature that they would be invalid under clause
(1)21 of this subdivision c, were they not excluded therefrom,
and liens of rent or distress for rent, of such a nature that they
are valid under such clause, shall be postponed in payment to
the debts specified in clauses (1) and (2) of Aubdivision a,
section 64 of this Act. Claims of rent or distress for rent secured
by liens valid apart from this subdivision c shall be restricted as
in section 64a(5), but may enjoy the highest priority here pro-
vided. Liens not preserved but postponed under this subdivision
(2)122 shall be also postponed to all liens upon the same prop-
erty which are indefeasible in bankruptcy."
"General Liens"
If the objections to present Section 67c that have been set forth
herein are well taken, the proposed amendment would accomplish
a change much to be desired. Enactment of the proposal would effect
three notable improvements cver the subdivision as it now reads:
(1) it would eliminate the distinction between liens on realty
and those on personalty;
(2) it would eliminate the discrimination against statutory liens
on personalty not accompanied by possession, levy, seques-
tration, or distraint;
(3) it would eliminate the confusion engendered in situations of
circuity of priority by dealing explicitly with the problem.
Its attack on priorities labelled as liens is aimed with considerably
improved accuracy when it strikes at "[a]ll statutory liens ... which
first become effective upon the insolvency of the debtor or upon
execution upon or distribution or liquidation of the property of the
debtor." The invalidation of "all statutory general liens ... as dis-
tinguished from statutory liens upon specified items of property" is
a less easily defended effort to reach the so-called "floating lien."
The terms "general lien" and "specific lien" are still encountered
with considerable frequency in judicial opinions, but whatever their
121. The reference intended here must be to clause (2), since clause (1)
does not invalidate any lien.
122. This must be "(3)" instead of "(2)" since postponement is effected
only by the third part. A more accurate reference, however, would be "clause(3)."
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original meanings, 123 they have been subjected to such corruption
that it may be doubted whether they retain the capacity to serve any
purpose for the legislative draftsman.
In a series of opinions stretching over the past twenty-five years
the Supreme Court has sustained the priority of the Federal Govern-
ment under Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes' 24 as against a
variety of liens, all of which were found to be general and inchoate. 125
The apex was reached perhaps in United States v. Gilbert Asso-
ciates,'2 0 involving the relative priority of the Government and a
tax lien of the town of Walpole, New Hampshire. The property
subject to the lien was certain machinery which was subject to an
ad valorem tax as real estate under New Hampshire law. The town
had not only assessed the tax involved; it had proceeded to fore-
closure of its lien by sale and had bid in the property at its own sale.
The town was nevertheless defeated by the subsequently attaching
priority of the United States because the town had only a general
lien. Since the Court said that the town's lien was "general" four
times,12 7 it is hardly possible to dismiss the description as a mere
inadvertence; moreover, the same kind of usage characterizes the
123. The distinction of early common law between "general" and
"specific" liens was clear enough: A specific lien, or a particular lien, was "a
right to retain the property of another on account of labour employed, or
money expended on that same property." A general lien was "a right to re-
tain the property of another on account of a general balance due from the
owner." Whitaker, op. cit. supra note 55, at 8-9. Both types of liens were
possessory and applied only to personal property. Brown, Personal Property
§§ 108, 109 (1936); Restatement, Security § 60 (1941). The common law
illogically denied either kind of lien, however, to agisters, private carriers,
and certain others who are now generally protected by statute. Note, 17
Cornell L. Q. 279 (1932). While the specific lien was conferred by the com-
mon law itself or by general custom, a general lien existed only when estab-
lished by special custom or usage of a particular trade or calling, by contract
of the parties, or by statute. Montagu, op. cit. supra note 55, at 26-39; Brown,
Personal Property 475 (1936).
It seems clear that the National Bankruptcy Conference draft is not in-
tended to codify the common-law distinction. The context of the draft evidences
an exclusive concern with the scope or extent of the property covered by the
lien; "general" is apparently used here in the sense Lord Coke used it in
Twyne's Case, 3 Coke 80b, 81a, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 812 (Star Chamber 1601),
to condemn a transfer "without exception of his apparel or anything of
necessity."
124. This statute, substantially unchanged since 1797, 1 Stat 515, 31
U. S. C. § 191 (1952), confers priority on the United States in any case
where the estate of an insolvent debtor, including one who is deceased, is
being administered by a third person. Bramwell v. United States F. & G. Co.,
269 U. S. 483, 488-490 (1926).
125. The cases are discussed seriatim in Kennedy, The Relative Priority
of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and
General Lien, 63 Yale L. J. 905, 911-918 (1954).
126. 345 U. S. 361 (1953).
127. Id. at 365-366.
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other recent opinions of the Court construing the same statute.128
In view of the vagueness of the terms under discussion and the con-
fusion bound to be engendered by their use it is to be hoped that if
they are incorporated in a newly enacted subdivision the accompany-
ing legislative reports will illuminate the draftsmen's meaning by
including some illustrative examples of the two kinds of liens.
Voidable Liens on Property Subject to Indefeasible Liens
Notwithstanding the elimination of the immunity for statutory
liens on realty it is suggested that the proposed Section 67c would
leave more liens intact in bankruptcy than does the present statute.
Since Section 67c now condemns many liens not infected with the
evil which the draftsmen undertook to remedy, the proposed con-
striction of the trustee's power to invalidate is an understandable
departure from the general course of bankruptcy legislation. One
limitation newly introduced into the statute seems capable of produc-
ing somewhat arbitrary results, however, and its wisdom may be
questioned. The new subdivision "does not apply to property which
cannot be sold in bankruptcy for more than the amount of the liens
upon it which are infeasible in bankruptcy." The provision thus re-
quires the trustee to reach the conclusion on the basis of a tentative
appraisal that there is such an "equity" in the property for the
bankrupt estate as can be realized on a judicial sale. Consideration
of a pair of hypothetical cases will make clear the basis for the sug-
gested criticism:
(1) Let it be supposed that property of the bankrupt is sub-
ject to a $10,000 mortgage that is indefeasible 129 in bankruptcy
and six $1,000 wage liens falling within the invalidating language
of the proposed second clause.180 If the property can be sold for no
128. Kennedy, supra note 125. In United States v. Waddill, Holland &
Flinn Inc., 323 U. S. 353, 356-357 (1945), the Court was confronted with a
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals holding that the landlord's lien before it
was "fixed and specific," but this binding declaration of state law was not
allowed to control the application of the federal priority statute. But cf.
United States v. New Britain, 347 U. S. 81, 86-87 (1954), where the Court
recognized that "the City's tax and water-rent liens apparently attached to
the specific property and became choate prior to the attachment of the federal
tax liens."
129. "Indefeasible" is a new term for the Bankruptcy Act and may not
always be clear in its application. See note 133 infra. Although the mortgage
is subject to being defeated by virtue of the exercise of the power to pre-
serve a senior lien that is itself voidable, it is assumed that "indefeasible" as
used in clause (1) must disregard -this possibility.
130. Such wage liens may be created by Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1204,
1206 (1953). The wage liens were sustained against the trustee in bankruptcy
in In re West Beverly Corp., 166 F. 2d 429 (9th Cir. 1948), but subordinated
to the federal priority under Rev. Stat. § 3466 in United States v. Division
of Labor Law Enforcement, 201 F. 2d 857 (9th Cir. 1953). Their relative
priority vis-4-vis mortgages and other liens does not seem to have been made
clear.
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more than $9,500, it is clear that the subdivision affects none of
the liens, and their relative priority will be determined by refer-
ence to nonbankruptcy lien law. Although the wage liens are
no more than priorities in disguise and the lienholders would be
entitled to priority for their wage claims insofar as they come
within Section 64a(2), the wage liens if prior under nonbank-
ruptcy law may prevail to the full extent of their value ($6,000)
and the mortgage would then absorb the balance ($3,500) to the
exclusion of the unsecured creditors of the bankrupt estate.
(2) Let it be supposed that the property in the above situa-
tion can be sold for $10,500. It is understood that the wage liens
can now be avoided or preserved. If superior under nonbank-
ruptcy law the wage liens can be preserved for the benefit of the
estate and the wage claimants accorded priority to the extent
permitted by Section 64a(4). The mortgage would again be
protected to the extent of the balance (here $4,500).
The difference in the treatment of the wage lienors in the two
situations does not appear to be justified. It is apparent that in the
first situation the trustee might be well advised to procure a bid in
excess of the sale value of the property in order to be able to avail
himself of the advantages that accrue to the estate when clauses
(2) and (3) of the proposed subdivision apply.131 The statute thus
creates an artificial situation and the bankruptcy or nonbankruptcy
objective it serves is not self-evident.
Preservation of Postponable Liens
The forthright treatment of the problem of circuity in the new
draft has been remarked. Parallel provisions in clauses (2) and (3)
assure that any lien invalidated or postponed thereunder shall be
invalidated or postponed as against all liens indefeasible in bank-
ruptcy. The court may, however, authorize preservation of any
lien voidable under the second clause in order that the general
creditors rather than inferior lienors shall benefit from application
of the clause. Strangely, there is no comparable preservation pro-
vision in clause (3) dealing with postponement. The resulting
incongruity is easily demonstrated:
(1) Let it be supposed that property of the bankrupt is sub-
ject to a $5,000 mortgage that is indefeasible in bankruptcy and
don't overlook a $3,000 tax lien prior to the mortgage under non-
bankruptcy law but subject to postponement under clause (3)ya2
131. Cf. note 97 supra and text thereto.
132. I.e., a tax lien which would be invalid under clause (2) of the draft
if it were not for the fact that such a lien is expressly excluded from the
invalidation provision of clause (2). Since tax liens do not ordinarily "first
become effective upon the insolvency of the debtor or upon execution upon
or distribution or liquidation of the property of the debtor," the only tax liens
likely to fall within the invalidation language of clause (2) would be
"general" tax liens. Presumably the federal tax lien created by Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 6321, would qualify since it attaches to "all property" of the tax
delinquent.
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If the property can be sold Lor $8,500, the third clause applies and
dictates that the tax lien "shall be postponed" to the debts en-
titled to priority under Section 64a(1) and (2). But what of the
mortgage? There is no authority for preserving the $3,000 lien,
and, "liens not preserved but postponed under this subdivision
(2) [(3) ?] shall be also postponed to all liens upon the same
property which are indefeasible in bankruptcy." The mortgage
then is manifestly to be paid in full, and the balance of $3,000
must be used first to defray administrative costs and to pay wage
claims entitled to priority under Section 64a.
(2) If on the other hand the property brings only $7,500,11
the tax lien would be enforced in full and the mortgage could be
enforced only against the balance ($2,500).
Although these strangely contrasting results seem to be required
by the language used, it is doubted that they conform to what the
draftsmen want or intended. The reference in the last sentence of
clause (3) to "liens not preserved but postponed" contains an impli-
cation that postponed liens may be preserved. The explicit provision
for preservation of voidable liens in clause (2), however, argues
convincingly against the existence of the implied power in clause
(3). The absence of any power to preserve liens subject to post-
ponement under present Section 67c reinforces the argument.1s4
There is on the other hand no apparent reason why a preserving
power should not be included in clause (3). An additional compli-
cation not presented in any of the preservation clauses now included
in the Bankruptcy Act needs to be noted here, however: Since the
postponement provision is operative for the benefit of only the
claimants entitled to priority under Section 64a(1) and (2), a
logical limitation on preservation under clause (3) would confine
the beneficiaries to such claimants and the extent of the preservation
to the total required to satisfy such claimants. If the total required
to pay the two priorities should exceed the amount of the preserved
lien, there should be no invasion by the priority claimants of the
security of the otherwise indefeasible lien. On the other hand, if the
postponable lien should contain an excess after discharge of the
133. This assumes that the tax lien which is merely postponed is inde-
feasible within the meaning of the third exclusionary provision in clause (1).
Cf. In re Hardy Plastics & Chem. Corp., 112 F. Supp. 878 (E.D. N.Y. 1953),
treating the United States, holding a postponed tax lien, as a secured creditor
for the purpose of computing statutory fees under § 40c(2) in a Chapter XI
proceeding. The term may be construed, however, not to apply to a lien
which is subject to the impairment of demotion. If only the mortgage is
indefeasible in the examples given, anomalous results nevertheless can be
shown to follow when the salable value varies but little above or a little below
the amount secured by the mortgage. The mortgage comes out intact if the
value is less but the tax lien is fully enforced if the value is greater than the
amount of the mortgage.
134. See notes 84 and 117 supra.
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claims entitled to priority under (1) and (2), there is no reason
why the lienholder should not retain the excess as against not only
inferior lienors but other unsecured creditors.
Correlation of Liens and Priorities
It does the Conference draft no credit but is perhaps politically
imperative that tax liens should not be subjected to invalidation in
the same way as other kinds of statutory liens. Accumulated tax liens
were the bane primarily responsible for the inclusion of a measure
diminishing the strength of statutory liens in the Chandler Act of
1938.135 It is to be observed, however, that they are subjected by the
Conference draft to postponement under the circumstances which
would require invalidation of other statutory liens. Since taxes are
in any event entitled to priority pursuant to Section 64a(4), the
only creditors directly benefiting from invalidation, as opposed to
postponement, of tax liens would be the small group who are
entitled to priority under Section 64a(3) and tax claimants entitled
to priority under Section 64a(4) but not to liens. Elevation of the
third class of priority claims would involve no significant inter-
ference with revenue since such claims arise only in the relatively
few cases where expenses are incurred in preventing or upsetting a
discharge or confirmation or arrangement or plan or in obtaining a
conviction of a criminal bankrupt. 3 8 Insofar as tax liens are ac-
corded preference in bankruptcy over unsecured tax claims, the
result is deemed to be without sufficient justification. The policy of
Section 64a(4) to treat all tax claims as on a parity without respect
to the chronology of their accrual or the nature of the taxing author-
ity is believed to be sound.1 3  The existence of a lien securing a
particular tax is, so far as concerns competing tax authorities inter
se, a circumstance which should not determine relative priority.
38
Invalidation of tax liens would afford an additional advantage under
the measure proposed in that the trustee would be enabled to pre-
serve those liens superior to otherwise indefeasible liens and thereby
135. Committee Report Analysis, supra note 32, at 212; Weinstein, op.
cit. supra note 32, at 144.
136. See Statement on Behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference in
Hearing, supra note 39, at 26. In order for claims for expenses to be allowed
under § 64a(3), it must be shown that they were incurred by a creditor or
creditors whose services were successful. 3 Collier 11 64.301 et seq.
137. 3 Collier II 64.02, at 2056; id. ff 64.401, at 2108-2109.
138. A tax liability secured by lien tends to differ from a tax not so
secured only by virtue of having become delinquent earlier and perhaps made
a matter of constructive notice by compliance with certain procedural formali-
ties. 3 Collier 11 64.403. Whether these formalities have been complied with are
not likely to be a matter of concern to other taxing authorities, since taxes are
ordinarily assessed and liens therefore caused to attach without reference to




to benefit all unsecured creditors including those with priority under
Section 64a. Regret is accordingly expressed over the special treat-
ment of tax liens which entails complications of language and of
administration without adequate justification in principle or policy.
The Chandler Act of 1938 took a modest step toward correlating
liens and priorities, even while it was complicating the schedule of
distribution in bankruptcy by inserting for the first time a category
of liens below certain classes of unsecured claims and above
others.'3 9 The correlation was most successful with respect to wage
liens, which under certain circumstances were postponed to the prior-
ity for wages and then restricted in the amount of their payment to the
same extent as provided for wage claims entitled to priority. The
result was that, except for wage liens escaping the reach of Section
67c altogether and those not restricted as against other liens, wage
liens were absorbed by wage priorities.1 40 Tax liens on personalty
unaccompanied by possession were assimilated to tax priorities, but
an advantage was preserved: Even when there were no creditors
entitled to priority under Section 64a(3), a tax authority asserting
a lien under Section 67c was one step ahead of those with priority
under Section 64a(4) .14 While rent lienors and landlords entitled
to priority under Section 64a(5) were ordinarily subjected to the
same restriction on the amount payable on their claims under the
Chandler Act, the position of rent lienors was substantially better
than that of landlords entitled to no more than a priority because of
the right of tax authorities to assert priority for their unsecured
claims over the latter but not the former.142
The amendment of 1952 carried the correlation project some-
what further. It has already been noted that its invalidation of
state-created liens not perfected by possession or levy of some kind
was viewed as an implementation of the policy recognized in the
abolition by the Chandler Act of state-created priorities except for
139. For more complete diszussion of this matter see Wolfe, supra
note 62; Note, 62 Yale L. J. 1131 (1953).
140. 4 Collier ff 67.21, at 207,'fl 67.28[ 1], at 307.
141. Two other minor advantages may be noted: A tax lien may be en-
forced even though it secures a penalty which can not be allowed as a claim
under § 57j. Kentucky v. Farmers Bank & Trust Co., 139 F. 2d 266 (6th Cir.
1943), criticized in Note, 3 Stan. L. Rev. 711, 723 (1951). It is also pointed
out in a Note, 62 Yale L. J. 1131, 1133 (1953), that a tax lien, even though
postponed under § 67c(1), may not be subject to the limitation placed on a
tax priority by § 64 under which payment of a property tax cannot exceed
the value of the interest of the bankrupt estate in the property. Both ad-
vantages should be eliminated.
142. See Note, 62 Yale L. J. :1131, 1133 (1953). An implication in Wein-
stein, op. cit. supra note 32 at 145, that the order of priority for landlords is
the same under § 64a and § 67c is due to an over simplification in statement of
the effect of the amendment of 1938.
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landlords.143 With reference to rent liens the amendment of 1952
appears to have overshot the mark. If a state-created rent lien is of
the kind invalidated by Section 67c(2), it can be accorded no recog-
nition whatsoever in bankruptcy although, of course, the debt once
secured thereby is a general claim against the estate,1 43a whereas a
state-created priority is still honored to the extent of rent accrued
within three months before bankruptcy. If the rent lien is accom-
panied by possession, levy, sequestration, or distraint, it is restricted
in the amount of payment to the same extent as is a state-created
priority, but it overrides all but the first two priorities.144 It is
apparent that if correlation is a desideratum, the Chandler Act and
the amendment of 1952 fell considerably short of realizing the full
possibilities of articulating the statutory lien and priority provi-
sions. 1 5
The National Bankruptcy Conference draft, like the two enacted
versions of the subdivision it would amend, treats the problem of
correlation as of secondary importance. It does correct the inequity
visited by present Section 67c(2) on a landlord holding an invali-
dated lien by saving to him the same rights as are accorded a
landlord with a priority under Section 64a(5)."' 6 By a provision
which seems to comprehend contractual and common-law liens for
rent as well as those created by statute, landlords holding liens
which are not invalidated by clause (2) are nevertheless forced to
accept subordination of their securities to the first and second
priorities and restriction to the same extent as landlords with no
more than a state-created priority under Section 64a(5).147 The
proposal thus would achieve uniformity with respect to the amounts
payable on rent liens and rent priorities, but it would still recognize
two ranks for landlords.
A FURTHER PROPOSAL
The authors of the present piece have been troubled by the com-
plexity and the convolutions of the National Bankruptcy Confer-
ence draft even while they approve its objectives and accomplish-
ments. They have wondered whether the following draft does not
attain substantially the same objectives in more economical and
143. See notes 101-102 supra and text thereto.
143a. Of course a court might be so impressed by the anomaly produced
by recognition in bankruptcy of a state-created priority for a landlord as
against a complete denial of any preference to a state-created lien for the
same kind of creditor that a rationale would be found for the conclusion that
the lien statute gave a priority for the purposes of § 64.
144. Note, 62 Yale L. J. 1131, 1134 (1953).
145. Cf. references cited in note 139 supra.
146. In the last sentence of clause (2).
147. This by the next to the last sentence of clause (3).
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direct language and whether, once its implications are properly
understood, it may not command as ready acceptance as the NBC
draft:
c. Every statutory lien which first becomes effective upon
the insolvency of the debtor, or upon distribution or liquidation
of his property, or upon execution against his property levied at
the instance of one other than the lienor ;14s every statutory lien
which is not perfected or enforceable as against subsequent bona
fide purchasers from the debtor; and every lien for rent 49 shall
be invalid as against the trustee: Provided, however, that the
court may, on due notice, order any such lien to be preserved for
the benefit of the estate and in that event the invalid lien shall
pass to the trustee. A lien not preserved but invalidated against
the trustee shall be invalid as against all liens indefeasible in
bankruptcy. Claims for wages, taxes, and rent secured by liens
hereby invalidated or preserved shall be respectively admitted
and restricted as are debts therefore entitled to priority under
clauses (2), (4), and (5) of section 64, subdivision a. This
subdivision shall not apply to liens enforced by sale before the
petition,1 50 nor to proceedings under section 77 of this Act, nor
148. The phrase, "levied at the instance of one other than the lienor,"
has been added to make clear the distinction between priorities in partial or
total liquidations and statutory liens enforced by judicial proceedings, includ-
ing execution, at the instance of the lienor. It is argued by Professor Wolfe,
supra note 62, that a statutory lien on personalty unaccompanied by possession,
levy, or distraint is a "floating lien" and that if there is an effort to enforce
such a lien by levy or distraint within four months of bankruptcy, it should
be voidable to the same extent as are liens by judicial proceedings under
§ 67a. Section 67a, however, does not affect liens by judicial proceedings that
enforce liens acquired over four months before bankruptcy. 4 Collier U
67.04[l]. Nor does it matter that the lien thus being enforced is inchoate. See
Mussman and Riesenfeld, Garnishment and Bankruptcy, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 1(1942). It may be that if a lien of the type invalidated by the first sentence of
the proposal made in the text is sought to be enforced by judicial proceedings
or by distraint within four months of bankruptcy, it should be subjected to
avoidance under § 67a when the other conditions of that provision are satisfied.
That would tend to correlate § 67a more closely with § 3a(3) as it now reads.
Cf. 4 Collier Uf 67.03 [4].
149. Like the National Bankruptcy Conference draft this proposal pur-
ports to deal with all rent liens: contractual, statutory, and common-law, and
whether arising by distress or otherwise. It may be esthetically objectionable
to deal with contractual liens here but if it is sound policy to assimilate rent
liens of whatever kind to the priority for rent, this seems an efficient way
to do it. The authors are dubious here: There is a serious question whether
contractual liens of landlords ought to be subjected to treatment different from
that given other kinds of contractual liens, even though landlords are specially
favored under § 64a(5). The problem is complicated by the fact that a land-
lord's contractual lien is likely to cover exempt property, and it is at least
doubtful that bankruptcy ought to interfere with this kind of bargain. Cf.
Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U. S. 294 (1903). It may be safer to stick
with the language of present 67c: every lien, "whether statutory or not,
of distress for rent."
150. No consideration seems to have been given anywhere to the impact
of §§ 67b and 67c on exempt property. It is doubted that statutory liens,
particularly tax liens, ought to be invalidated insofar as they attach to exempt
property. It may therefore be advisable at this juncture to add "liens against
exempt property" to the list of exclusions in the last sentence.
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to proceedings under chapter X of this Act unless an order
has been entered therein directing that bankruptcy be proceeded
with.'15
Even a cursory examination of this proposal discloses that it ad-
heres closely to the National Bankruptcy Conference draft. It aban-
dons the techniques of postponement and restriction of liens. It aban-
dons the attempt to differentiate between general liens and those upon
specified items of property in favor of a test which is familiar under
both bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy law and can be easily applied. 15 2
The new test is predicated on the assumption that if a particular lien
has sufficient integrity under nonbankruptcy law to bind property
even as against bona fide purchasers, it ought to be recognized as
effective against the trustee. 5 3 If the debtor can scrape off the lien
by disposing of the property to a subsequent bona fide purchaser,
then the lien is a tenuous one and so like a stautory priority estab-
lished for settling conflicting claims of competing creditors in a
partial or total liquidation that it ought to be treated like one in
bankruptcy. If a statutory lien is not perfected as against a levying
creditor, it is of course now vulnerable to attack by the trustee under
Section 70c0 4 Unless they have liens valid as against subsequent
purchasers, it relegates wage, tax, and rent lienors to their priorities,
thereby achieving a closer correlation of the lien provisions with
151. The saving provisions in the NBC draft, "does not apply to prop-
erty which cannot be sold in bankruptcy for more than the amount of the
liens upon it which are indefeasible in bankruptcy" and "does not apply to
solvent bankrupt estates," have not been included here. The reasons for
omitting the first are discussed in the text accompanying notes 129-131, supra.
The second is a rephrasing of an exception now appearing in § 67c. It was
first introduced into the section by the amendment of 1952 without any reason
being given for its inclusion. In view of the fact that an estate may be solvent
only because of the inclusion of substantial exempt assets, the desirability of
such a limitation is questionable, and it has accordingly been deleted. See 4
Collier ff 67.02[3], at 40.
The exclusionary provisions referring to reorganization proceedings
under § 77 and Chapter X are broader than corresponding provisions in pres-
ent § 67c, but the reason for the limitation on these exclusionary provisions is
not clear. See 4 Collier f1 67.20[8], at 203. It may be wondered whether ap-
plication to proceedings under Chapter XII should not also be denied.
152. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 3b, 21g, 60a(2), 67a(3), 67d(6), and 70d.
With reference to the development and utility of the concept outside of bank-
ruptcy see Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63
Yale L. J. 1057 (1954).
153. Certainly such an attribute negatives any suggestion that the lien is
no more than a priority or that it is merely a "floating lien" on fluctuating
assets of the debtor.
154. 4 Collier ff 67.26, at 283-286. It is possible for circuity of priority to
develop under § 70c: if, e.g., an attachment lien indefeasible under § 67a and
a federal tax lien not perfected under Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 6323 cover the
same property, the tax lien may be invalid against the trustee under § 70c(see note 159 infra) yet superior to the attachment lien (see note 80 spra).
It seems desirable, therefore, for a preservation clause to be included in § 70c.
The justification for such an amendment exists whether or not the proposed
draft of § 67c is adopted. Cf. note 117 supra.
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those for priority.' "
The opposition of the representatives of the United States
Treasury,'5 6 not to mention those of the state and local taxing authori-
ties, 5 7 must of course be anticipated with respect to any proposal
that alters without substantially improving the position of the
Government. It is to be noted that the position of the United States
is improved by the proposal with respect to liens on personalty
perfected by notice-filing ;158 and so far as its liens on both realty
and personalty which have not been so perfected are concerned, the
proposed statue goes no further than to codify the view already taken
in several cases. 159 No discrimination is made against state or local
authorities in respect to any statutory liens given them by state
statute. The holder of an invalidated tax lien is treated worse than
the postponed tax lienor in only two situations: (1) when there
are claims entitled to priority under Section 64a()-a compara-
tively rare situation; (2) when the result of invalidation is to compel
the tax lienor to share pro ratia with a tax claimant under Section
64a(4) whereas postponement would permit realization on the lien
in advance of any distribution to priority claimants below the first
two classes. The latter result may of course work sometimes to
the advantage and sometimes the disadvantage of any particular tax
claimant. The proposal to enforce pro rata distribution in payment
of all tax claims is at any rate sound and can stand on its own.
If the prolonged efforts to obtain a restriction in the amounts pay-
able on tax claims accorded priority under section 64a(4) ever
attain success, 6° the adoption of the proposed draft would make the
limitation effective with respect to taxes secured by liens unless
perfected in the manner prescribed. But that problem gets us into
another story.
155. In this the draft proceeds along lines suggested elsewhere. See in
addition to references cited in note 139, 4 Collier 1 67.20[3] ; Statement in
Behalf of the Nat. Bankruptcy Conf., Hearing, rupra note 39, at 25. •
156. Cf. H. R. Rep. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13, 21 (1952), noting
that the Treasury Department objected to provisions in the 1952 amendment
of the Bankruptcy Act even though the Government was adequately protected
and, indeed, its position was actually bettered somewhat.
157. Cf. Hearing, supra note 139.
158. Federal tax liens perfected by notice filing under Int. Rev. Code of
1954 § 6323 are valid against subsequent bona fide purchasers. Schmitz v.
Stockman, 151 Kan. 891, 101 P. 2d 962 (1940) (tax lien on wheat grown by
farmer-debtor enforced against innocent purchasers of wheat.)
159. See, e.g., United States v. Sands, 174 F. 2d 384, 385 (2d Cir. 1949),
approved by Oglebay, Some Developments in Bankruptcy Law, 24 3. N. A.
Ref. Bankr. 24, 27 (1950) ; In re Sport Coal Co., 125 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. W. Va.
1954) ; cf. Sampsell v. Straub, 194 F. 2d 228 (9th Cir. 1951) ; McKay v.
Trusco Finance Co., 198 F. 2d 431 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Seligson, supra note 84,
at 11. Cf. note 106 supra.
160. See note 70 supra.
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